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Problem description
Premise:
Safety and Automation Systems (SAS) provide means that permit easy im-
plementation and further use of inhibits and overrides during most operat-
ing conditions. These facilities may prove beneficial during many operating
conditions but, at the same time, can impose serious threats against safe
operation.
Objective:
A survey will be launched with the purpose of collecting information regard-
ing usage of inhibits/overrides on some randomly selected installations. An
in-depth analysis of the data will be executed in order to assess and present
issues of:
• statistics; e.g. number of inhibits/overrides during different time inter-
vals, duration, appearance of same tags, simultaneous inhibits/overrides
of redundant functions, etc.
• comparison between installations/shift/personnel
• compliance with procedures/adequacy of procedures
• level of safety threats
Assignment given: January 10, 2011
Supervisor: Professor Tor Onshus

Abstract
The main purpose of this thesis has been to identify the general usage of the
applications inhibit and override for a collection of installations operated
by Statoil ASA. The applications are provided by a Safety and Automation
System (SAS) that performs monitoring, control and safeguarding of the
plant and its process. Logs that keep track of the SAS operator’s actions
and other facility-related events have been received from each installation,
and regarded with respect to:
• the general evolvement and trend of the application usage
• instances of inhibits/overrides of long-term character
• redundant signals that are inhibited/overridden simultaneously
• critical time periods that exhibit high activity
• tags that are frequently involved in the application usage
The results that were obtained for each above-mentioned point made it pos-
sible to give a stetement of how the installations are controlled through uti-
lization of the safety-impairing, but useful applications.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Earlier work
This thesis can be regarded as a continuation of [6], which is a paper that
was conducted as a solution to a project assignment given in the fall semester
of 2010. The problem that was addressed then is generally the same problem
that shall be treated here, but there are some differences that are important
to emphasize:
• All the previous work that was done in [6] was solely based on one
single event log. Now, however, up to six event logs originating from
six distinct oil production units are being considered in the analysis.
This opens up for more valuable interpretation of the results, because
of the now-existing comparison opportunities.
• Other, more orderly and descriptive methods have now been utilized in
the presentation of the results, compared to earlier work. In addition,
a completely new aspect of analysis is proposed; the weekly usage of
inhibits/overrides is kept track of, hence making it possible to detect
potential patterns/trends in the way the operators carry out realiza-
tions of the applications. Moreover, key statistical quantities related
to these collected data are introduced.
Because the only available data at the time [6] was written were logs con-
taining overviews of all the historical instances of inhibits and overrides, it
(then) appeared natural to focus on individual cases of, for example, long-
term incidents. It turns out that conclusions that are drawn exclusively on
the basis of such kind of information, in the end can prove to be invalid. This
is due to the lack of information concerning compensating measures or other
initiatives taken by the operating crew in relation to every realization of an
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impairing event. Because of this, it will no longer be drawn any ”uncertain”
conclusions, but instead emphasized to create an overall, general image of
the situations at the different installations.
1.2 Motivation
It is widely known that manipulation of the control of a plant’s production
process through utilization of functionalities such as inhibit and override,
may lead to potentially dangerous situations. Still, it is important for an op-
erator to be in possession of the ability to apply such applications to certain
signals if necessary, as shall be argued for in later sections. However, what
is fundamental if the level of safety at an installation is reduced, is that the
operator and other responsible personnel are aware of the weakenings and
consequently deal with them.
The main motivational factor for carrying out a survey of the general us-
age of inhibits/ovrrides at different petroleum installations, is the knowledge
that these applications have the capability of acting as a direct or indirect
cause to an accident. The long-tail effects of such disasters usually involve
massive environmental damage (including damage to the local wildlife), while
the immediate response often is given in terms of loss of human lives and dam-
age to equipment. If disastrous cases of inhibits/overrides were completely
eliminated, several historical accidents could have been avoided. This shall
be supported later through the demonstration of an example. The survey
that has been done in this thesis will identify the general usage of the afore-
mentioned applications, hence reflecting the characteristic evolvement of the
various situations (based on the received logs). After having established
familiarization with the results, Statoil will be able to address thoroughly
processed data, allowing for follow-up activities on their initiative. Through
possible revisions of operator procedures on the related field, the results may
have impact on the daily operational activities at the installations.
1.3 Thesis outline
The dissertation has been conducted with the root objective that the topics
shall be presented in a natural succession and order, in addition to provide
the reader with a guiding line that can be followed through the entire thesis;
from introduction through conclusion. It has also been emphasized to keep
the reader within the frames of the work, so that no larger digressions steal
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the focus of attention. The thesis does not assume that the reader possesses
any great knowledge within the field of SAS and safety, hence sufficient re-
views of theory will be made on the topic in advance of the presentation of
the reuslts.
In Chapter 2, the required portion of theory is introduced, starting off by
diving into the answer to how an SAS is structured and how it works; its
constellation and functionality. In the same chapter, the core facilities inhibit
and override will be explained very carefully, i.e. all the aspects related to
their functionality and usage, risks and areas of application. This is then
embraced by the presentation of standards and regulations associated with
their signification in practice. In order to relate all of this to reality, it is
provided an example of an actual accident as a consequence of improper ap-
plication usage.
Chapter 3 presents an overview of the installations that have been included
in the analysis, in addition to regarding some aspects related to the nature
of the problem that had to be taken into consideration on beforehand of the
examination of the data. In this chapter, also the methods that were used to
solve the different sub-problems are explained, followed by the actual prob-
lem statement itself and presentation of the assumptions that were made.
Finally, in Chapter 4, the results of the analytical work are revealed together
with their accompanying individual discussions, before it is all wrapped up
by stating some concluding remarks about the findings (Chapter 5). For
future work that is either based on this thesis’ problem or results, some rec-
ommendations and suggestions to interesting aspects that may be taken into
account are made, also in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 2
Theory and background
This chapter goes through all the background theory that is necessary for the
reader to be familiarized with in order to be capable of properly interpreting
the results that will later be presented. It will be started off on a basic level
by presenting what an SAS is and how it works, before it is narrowed down
to address detailed theory related to the applications inhibit and override.
First of all, acquaintance shall be made with the fundamental composition
and structure of an SAS.
2.1 Safety and Automation System (SAS)
An SAS performs monitoring, logic control and safeguarding of an installa-
tion [1]. Roughly divided, an SAS consists of three types of elements; sensors,
logic solvers and final control elements. Their composition is illustrated in
Figure 2.1. A consideration of the following example will help a person who
does not possess any significant background knowledge on the topic to gain
some insight to how an SAS actually operates: a flow meter measures the
immediate flow in a pipe and sends the information over to a microcontroller.
The microcontroller proceeds by processing the received information and ac-
cordingly makes decisions on what should be done depending on the given
value of the flow. After the solver has finished the comparison between im-
mediate flow and stipulated flow limits, an output signal is generated on the
basis of the outcome of the comparison, and sent to the valve governing the
pipe flow. The servomechanism located on the valve (actuator) is activated,
and the response action to the measured flow state is carried out through
position adjustment of the specific valve.
5
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Sensors
Logic solver
Final elements
Figure 2.1: SAS composition.
As shall be seen later in this thesis, regulations and standards, design ap-
proaches, etc. that apply to development of Safety Instrumented Systems
(SIS) are used on an equal footing in the development process of SASs. This
is because the SIS can be said to be part of the SAS, hence both systems
are subject to the same governing documents when it comes to safety level
requirements. Also integrated in the SAS is the system responsible for con-
trolling the plant process - the Process Control System (PCS). The approach
where the SIS and the PCS are combined into one large system versus the
other approach where they are separated, can be viewed in Figure 2.2. A
PCS may be based on a bunch of different control strategies depending on
the nature and characteristics of the particular process (internal dynamics),
but some of the most popular and well-established methods within the field
of process control can be listed without taking into account the process dy-
namics: optimal control (such as Model Predictive Control (MPC)), adaptive
control (such as Certainty Equivalence Control (CEC)) and robust control
(such as H∞-control).
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Safety and Automation System (SAS)
Process Control System (PCS)
Safety Instrumented System (SIS)
Plant process
Plant process
Figure 2.2: Alternative system architectures.
The merger of the two systems into a single, larger system, has brought with
it both advantages and disadvantages on different levels of operation. Nat-
urally, it is more practical for the operators to only have interference with
one single operator station when operator action is demanded by the system
or when the operator himself/herself wants to take some kind of action (for
example to adjust a setpoint value), instead of being forced to make engage-
ments through several stations which often have their own, individual Human
Machine Interfaces (HMI). However, this beneficial aspect directly results in
a major drawback that should be noted: due to the joint usage of hardware
and software in the operator stations, a failure in either one of the two will
affect both the PCS and SIS interface. In other words, the merger brings
with it a common point of failure, hence less robust systems are especially
vulnerable. This should be taken into consideration by the system designers
in an early phase of the process.
The issue of independence between safety systems offshore has been stud-
ied closer by Hauge et al. in [7], and it is appropriate to reproduce some
of the key findings that were made there. It was generally found that sig-
nals were sent from subordinate protection layers to their respective superior
protection layers (e.g. signal flow from Process Shutdown Systems (PSD) to
Emergency Shutdown Systems (ESD)). This practice shall ideally not occur
since a risk for evolvement of failure-propagation from subordinate to supe-
rior layers will consequently arise, thus the main, fundamental purpose of
the hierarchy division will be lost. Furthermore, it was in some cases seen
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that safety-critical instrumented functions were implemented as a part of the
PCS, and not as a part of the SIS. This is in conflict with an important
demand for independence between control systems and safety systems made
by The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA). This shall be debated
more carefully in later sections that regard the topic of standards and reg-
ulations. There exists a large number of documents that make demands to
all kinds of things related to SASs operation, and that are very important
for institutions that are involved in the oil industry to comply with. Other
findings concerning independence between the PCS and SIS were also made,
for example that the two systems often shared communication network and
other hardware, where heavy traffic from one of the two systems could lead
to trouble for the other. However, the reader is referred to [7] for a more
detailed overview.
2.2 Conceptual SAS topology
Norsk Sokkels Konkurranseposisjon’s (NORSOK) standard I-002 presents
a clear and conceptual SAS topology in one of its annexes (Annex C). It
is intended as an informative annex, but the described way of arranging
the overall system together seems to appeal to many system designers, and
appears as the most common way of solving the SAS topology problem.
The structure is presented in Figure 2.3, and will be reviewed in a step-by-
step manner below. Incidentally, NORSOK is an organization that issues
a set of standards which are administered through an organization named
Standards Norway (SN), in order to assure adequate safety, value adding
and cost effectiveness for the petroleum industry on Norwegian continental
shelf.
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Figure 2.3: Conceptual SAS topology, as presented in [1].
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In this example, it is assumed that the total system is equipped with two
operator stations (A and B, respectively), as well as an Information Man-
agement System (IMS) station. The IMS is used exclusively for presentation
of information and storage of event data [1]. It should not be possible to
take actions upon any process control or safeguarding equipment through
the IMS interface. Nevertheless, it will have the same access rights (in terms
of reading access, not writing) as the operator stations due to the shared SAS
network. It will also be possible to pass on the collected information further
into an onshore location as demonstrated by the drawing.
Connected to the SAS network are multiple subsystems which can be con-
trolled individually from the operator stations or from action panels. Two of
the most critical parts of the safety system, the Fire & Gas System (F&G)
and Emergency Shutdown System (ESD), are typically provided the action
panels. The main mission of the ESD is to prevent abnormal conditions at
the facility to escalate into major hazards. When an hazardous situation
first has taken place, the ESD shall also limit the extent of damage. The
F&G shall continuously monitor for the presence of gasses that may be toxic
or lead to fire/explosion, in addition to monitoring for actual fires, so that
the personnel have the opportunity to be alerted in advance of a potential
dangerous event [8]. This is achieved by using addressable discrete sensors,
as shown in the figure. The advantage addressable sensors have over non-
addressable sensors is that the firefighters are able to find out exactly where
the abnormal fire/gas situation is evolving, as each sensor is assigned a unique
address. Additionally, if the sensor is analog, the quantity of fire or gas will
be known as well.
Moreover, it can be seen that the Process Shutdown System (PSD) and Pro-
cess Control System (PCS) are hooked up to the SAS network. The PSD’s
main task is to monitor and safeguard the core of the production process and
consequently take action if abnormal conditions are detected. If the situation
gets bad enough, the ESD may invoke the PSD to shut down the whole or
parts of the process. Next in line is the PCS which is controlling the plant
process to behave according to operator specifications, so that desired pro-
cess outcomes are obtained. Fieldbus is typically used in the communication
between the PCS and the belonging network of controllers. This is a type
of communication network that has a number of advantages, but explaining
these in detail is outside the scope of this thesis. The reader is referred to
[9] for more information on the topic of automation networks.
Another important part of the overall facility control system is the Power
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Distribution Control System (PDCS) which controls and monitors the elec-
tric power generation and distribution network supplying the facility [1]. It
is critical to achieve a well-behaved control of both frequency and amplitude
of the power that goes out to the site apparatus, since incorrectly supplied
instruments may be damaged. To ensure that this is not happening, electri-
cal circuit breakers are installed as a part of the package acting as a barrier
against the danger. The circuit breakers will break the electrical circuit so
that plant apparatus is not supplied with current containing spikes or other
damaging phenomena. Also communicating with the PDCS is the Motor
Control Center (MCC). This is a center which masters the many electric
motors that are spread around the entire installation.
2.3 The life-cycle of a safety-related system
International Electrotechnical Commission’s (IEC) standard IEC 61508 presents
a technical framework for the developmental process of a safety-related sys-
tem in terms of an overall safety life-cycle. The life-cycle describes ”the life”
of a safety system from birth to death, and contains 16 individual phases.
The model is so well-established in the industry that it is worth taking a
deeper dive into the thoughts that lie behind its existence. It is intuitive and
easy to understand, and has been used frequently by system developers as
a guideline since the time it was first published. IEC 61508 is a reputable
and well-known international standard together with its close related IEC
61511, which shall be considered in a later section. It is a generic standard,
which means that it is applicable to all Electrical/Electronic/Programmable
Electronic (E/E/PE) safety-related systems, regardless of application.
In general, IEC is a non-profit-making organization that releases interna-
tional standards in relation to electrotechnologic devices and systems. These
standards often serve as a basis for further national standards that are gen-
erated inside each country. In Norway, The Norwegian Oil Industry Associa-
tion (OLF) publishes the document OLF-070 which is a guideline to how to
use and implement IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 on petroleum installations on
Norwegian continental shelf. This can be read more about in Appendix B.
The overall safety life-cycle that have been spoken of above is reproduced in
Figure 2.4. Each of the phases will be explained in more detail beneath the
figure.
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Figure 2.4: The overall safety life-cycle, as presented in [2].
It is very important to obtain a sufficient level of understanding with respect
to the Equipment Under Control (EUC) and its environment. This is the
scope of phase one in the cycle. The EUC is basically all the equipment, ma-
chinery, apparatus or plant used for manufacturing, process, transportation,
medical or other activities [2]. In other words, all the parts that are included
in the overall system. When this is completed, the standard suggests that
the developers define the overall scope of the safety-related system, some-
thing that can be done by determining where to place the boundary that
separates the EUC from the EUC control system. The EUC control system
bases its outputs on inputs from the plant process and relevant setpoints,
and aims to control the available EUC such that the total system attains a
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desirable behavior. Then, maybe the most critical phase of them all follows;
hazard and risk analysis. During this phase, all possible hazards that may
arise from consecutive event sequences are to be determined, together with
the EUC risks associated with them. Obviously, this is a complex process,
but it is very important that nothing is left to chance and that all possible
operating conditions/circumstances are incorporated in the analysis.
When the safety-related system’s development team has given an account
of all the practicable unsafe outcomes in the system, they can carry on the
process by developing requirement specifications for the overall system, and
accordingly assign/allocate Safety Functions (SF) to each and every one of
them. This is phase four and five, respectively. When the first five phases are
successfully carried through with by the team, the analysis part of the design
process is over. Henceforth, the issues of planning, realization and operation
are considered. This involves planning and development of procedures that
address operation and maintenance (phase six), validation (phase seven) and
installation and commissioning (phase eight). It is important that this work
is done very carefully, as procedures that are precise and easy to interpret
can save the responsible company for time and trouble (and thus costs).
When this is done on an holistic basis, the attention can be paid to the
E/E/PE part of the safety-related system (referred to as the SIS/SAS in this
thesis). Phase nine concentrates on defining a Safety Requirement Specifi-
cation (SRS) in terms of the already defined SFs for the SAS, while Phase
10 is concerning the actual realization of the SAS so that the requirements
and demands to the system are fulfilled. If it turns out that the SAS is not
sufficient (but only necessary) in order to meet the specified requirements,
other risk-reducing measures must be considered as well to fill in for the gaps.
This is done in Phase 11.
Furthermore, the physical installation, commissioning, and then validation
and daily operation follow. All of these activities are done according to pro-
cedures developed in the earlier phases, and are treated in Phase 12, 13 and
14 respectively. If the buyers are satisfied with the existing distributor, they
can request a retrofit. This requires parts of the hardware and/or software
to be replaced and renewed. This is, of course, assuming that upgrades are
available on the market. Often, a reason for a company to carry out a retrofit
is that the authorities that verify the systems - the classification societies -
require new features or safety measures in their verification procedures. At
the end of an SAS life, decommissioning is eventually carried out and it can
again be started at phase one in the life-cycle if a new safety-related system
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is to be developed (of course making use of the knowledge that was gained
during the developmental process of the earlier SASs).
Something else that must be considered during system design, and which
also is a term presented in IEC 61508, is Safety Integrity Level (SIL). This
is a statistical measure of the safety-related system’s capability of carrying
out a safegurading action on demand from the process [2]. In Figure 2.5, the
four levels of safety integrity are presented, where a function holding a level
of safety integrity four is approved for maximum safety and SIL 1 represents
the lowest level of safety. The SIL concept is used, among others, by the
authoroties to specify their requirements for safety related to various safety
functions distributed for different purposes around the facility. For certain
safety functions a higher probability for that the corresponding safeguarding
action will be carried out on process demand may be required, for example
in the case of process shutdown due to the scenario of abnormal pressure
conditions in a tank, for example. For other, less critical functions, a SIL of
1 may be adequate/sufficient. If the above-mentioned guideline OLF-070 is
complied with during system design, a minimum level of safety integrity will
be provided for the overall system. In some cases, it may have a reassuring
effect to dedicate a safety function a higher SIL than what is required by
the authorities. However, often it is necessary to just meet the minimum
requirements in order to minimize costs.
 
S afety 
I ntegri ty 
L evel  
L ow D emand Mo de of O peration 
(Pr. of  fai lure to perform i ts 
safety functions on demand) 
C ontinuous/H igh-demand Mo de 
of O peration 
(Pr. of  dangerous fai lure per hour) 
4 >= 10-5 to 10-4 >= 10-9 to 10-8 
3 >= 10-4 to 10-3 >= 10-8 to 10-7 
2 >= 10-3 to 10-2 >= 10-7 to 10-6 
1 >= 10-2 to 10-1 >= 10-6 to 10-5 
 
Figure 2.5: SIL table, as given in [2].
2.3.1 IEC 61511’s role in the cycle
While IEC 61508 is a standard concerning safety-related systems in general,
IEC 61511 is a more specific standard which exclusively concentrates on the
SIS’s role in the safety hierarchy. Simply, it can be said that it is a process
sector implementation of IEC 61508. Exactly like its ”parental standard”,
also this standard exhibits a safety life-cycle in order to spread its message
and guide SIS developers on their way in developing an SIS whose measures
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are in accordance with given safety regulations. Besides that the life-cycle-
focus of IEC 61508 is on the overall system and that the life-cycle-focus of
IEC 61511 is on the SIS, the two life-cycles are approximately identical, thus
a reconstruction of the latter will not be presented in this section. By just
imagining that the one presented in Figure 2.4 also applies to the evolution-
ary process of an SIS, a parallel can be drawn intuitively.
The standard makes explicit demands to the specification, design, installa-
tion, operation and maintenance phases of the SIS through clauses that are
stated sequentially in the document. The goal is to achieve that the plant
process, at any time, finds itself in a safe state. The term safe state is defined
to be a state of the process when safety is achieved [10]. And again, safety is
exactly freedom from unacceptable risk [10]. Many of these expressions are
intuitive to understand and do not actually need any further explanation.
Notwithstanding, they are all explained and defined in a thorough fashion
in the standards that speak of them in order to avoid misunderstandings. It
should also be stressed that the expressions may have different meanings in
different contexts (e.g. a definition of an expression in IEC 61508 may differ
from the definition of the same expression in IEC 61511).
2.4 Explanation of the applications
To rule out the possibility for misunderstandings, it is important to provide
the reader with clear and unambiguous definitions of the concepts that are
being discussed. In the following sections, perhaps the two most cited terms
in this thesis are being thoroughly explained.
2.4.1 Inhibit
Inhibit is an application provided by the SAS which the operator can make
use of in cases where it is desirable to make the system logic independent
of an input signal. This implies that the value of the relevant input signal
is not taken into consideration when the logic solver processes the received
information and is about to decide what should be done as a reaction to the
process state/condition. This again leads to that the corrsponding safeguard-
ing action that normally should have been carried out in such a situation,
fails to appear. Consider the following scenario: a sensor located somewhere
on the installation measures a pressure. The logic solver will perform an
evaluation of the pressure measurement and check whether it is exceeding an
upper bound of what is acceptable for safety purposes, or not. Accordingly,
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the corresponding safeguarding action should be to ease/relieve the pressure,
if the result of the evaluation is that the situation may appear as impend-
ing. Consequently, an inhibition of the sensor input signal will prevent the
pressure-relief from being carried out. In some of the literature, inhibit is
also referred to as blocking, as for example in [1]. Hereupon is the definition
that will be used throughout this thesis:
Inhibit, or blocking, means to disable a safeguarding function, but allowing
associated alarm annunciation as well as manual/automatic control. Inhibit,
or blocking, applies to both individual action alarms1 and input signals ef-
fecting safeguarding and disabling functions. [1]
2.4.2 Override
Override is another application provided by the SAS which the operator can
make use of in cases where it is desirable to make an output signal indepen-
dent of the system logic. This assumes, however, that the output signal is
given an external value so that the terminal device (final control element) has
a command/an instruction to act in accordance with at any time, in order
to not receive empty messages. The external value that is fed into the ap-
paratus varies on request from the operator or other management personnel,
which in turn depends on the purpose of the override. By making use of the
example given above in the inhibit section, the effect of an override can be
explained easily; consider that the final control element whose role is to re-
lieve the pressure in the case of overpressure consists of a valve, and that the
signal leading to this valve has been overridden. The consequence of this will
be that the control mechanism which is controlling the motion of the valve
(actuator), not obeys any command coming from the logic solver, but instead
only listens to predefined operator instructions. This is the importance of
carrying out an override, and the applications to both inhibit and override
will be presented in the succeeding sections. It shall be emphasized that
when the term ”application” is used, it can refer to either the applications
inhibit/override, or their area of application, i.e. the actual interpretative
meaning of the word. This will, however, be possible to understand out from
the context which the word is placed in. As before, NORSOK provide us
with a concise definition:
Override means to set the output signal to a predefined state, independent
1An individual action alarm is an alarm feature in the SAS intended for automatic con-
trol and safeguarding actions. This type of alarms includes blocking facilities, in contrast
to warning alarms [1].
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of changes in logic states. [1]
A visualization of the functionality of the above-mentioned applications is
shown in Figure 2.6 below.
Matrix, mapping inputs to 
outputs
 
Sensor, input
Inhibit
Override
Predened 
value/state
Final element, output
Figure 2.6: Inhibit and override, inspired by figure presented in [3].
2.5 Areas of application
There are several areas of application related to the functionalities of inhibit
and override, such as maintenence work, testing and shutdown prevention.
The ones that are most used in practice and regarded as the ”most common”
ways of utilizing the facilites will be presented in the following sections.
2.5.1 Inhibit
The inhibit functionality is utilized in situations related to process operation,
but occasionally it is also applied for test purposes. A case of the latter area
of application is presetned in [11] through an Operational Sequence Diagram
(OSD), proposing a method for how to perform tests on Pressure Trans-
mitters (PT). It is suggested a procedure where the operator starts off the
routine by setting an inhibit flag on the PT tag in the SAS. This inhibition
is carried out through an instrument technician who isolates the PT, hence
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making it independent from other parts included in the control of the plant
process. Furthermore, a calibration is carried out in order to achieve mea-
surement reliability. The next step is to make the PT subject to a changing
pressure environment so that alarms in the system are triggered. The test
is considered as successful if alarms go off at respective alarm limits. This
kind of testing is actually possible to perform without having any stop in
production. This is a direct consequence of the inhibit’s functionality, that
is to make the system logic independent from the incoming sensor signal, so
that the related final control element is not invoked despite of the critical
change in pressure. If this is done correctly, process shutdown commands are
avoided.
The need for the inhibit property also arises in the daily operational manage-
ment of a plant. While the purpose of using the application in a test context
is to check whether sensor equipment is working or not, the intent of using it
in an operational context is to prevent safeguarding actions from taking place
as consequences of abnormal process conditions. This may be of interest to
the operator if his/her inhibit intervention results in that plant production
is maintained and shutdown actions are avoided. This will, however, require
that the operator, or other administrative personnel, have conducted a risk
analysis (the thoroughness of the assessment depends on the situation) of
the outcome, so that the plant safety is not reduced significantly due to the
inhibit action. If the result of the assessment is that the initiative does not
have the potential of putting humans, environment or equipment in danger,
the action may be realized. To tie this up against a real operational sce-
nario, the following example can be considered: a sensor is broadcasting an
incorrect measurement value, which is very unfavorable seen from a process
control perspective. The measurements will propagate their path further to
the logic solver and final control elements, hence it may seem appropriate to
inhibit the signal so that ill-behaved process evolvement is avoided. More-
over, there exists evidence that the functionality has been abused in order
to avoid process shutdown, despite the fact that this had been the safest
thing to go through with. A practical example which demonstrates how the
facilites can be related to an actual situation of process control is addressable
in Appendix A.
2.5.2 Override
Primarily, the override facility is used under four different settings; during
operation, for maintenance purposes, in test situations and in the start-up
phase of a process. During maintenance work, advantage can be gained with
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respect to safety by overriding the final control element which is to be re-
paired or serviced, in the way that the apparatus cannot constitute any harm
to the servicing crew while work is ongoing. Neither is it preferable to have
an ill-behaving final control element which is interfering with process control
or plant safeguarding. A maintenance override gives the operator an oppor-
tunity to make the element independent from system logic.
Normally, certain output signals are required to be overriden during the
initialization phase of a process in order to ”get the wheels going” and make
a start-up feasible [5]. The reason for this is that currently existing input
signals do not satisfy the logic’s conditions to enable start-up operations, so
this must be done artificially and forced by the operator. Shutdown func-
tions must be blocked so that shutdown is not demanded during start-up
[12]. The functionality of start-up overrides shall, according to [10], be val-
idated so that conditions related to such a critical situation can be shown
and documented to be safe. Moreover, start-up criteria should be specified
in procedures that are available for the operator. A hazard preventive mea-
sure would be to automatically disable start-up overrides after a certain time
limit so they are not present in the system beyond time periods of necessity.
For overrides that are set to indefinite time intervals (and are not reset au-
tomatically), a good practice is to remind the operator of the overrides that
are alive in the system by providing recurrent alarms [12].
If a final control element needs to be tested for its operational purpose, the
item can be set subject to an override. This can only be done in cases where
enforcement of the final control element value does not affect the process
negatively or sets up dangerous situations, such as closing of pressure-valves
that do not lead to pressure build-up/accumulation, etc. In situations where,
for example, start-up of a pump on command from operator will have bad
influence on the process control, other approaches must be undertaken for
the execution of the test event. Actually, the most useful aspect related
to overrides seen in a test context, is to check whether the logic device re-
turns the correct value on the output, given a set of inputs. This can most
easily be explained through a short example; given the condition that a ther-
mometer measurement that exceeds 100◦C shall trigger a shutdown action
of the whole plant. If it is of interest to simply verify that correct output
value is set by the logic, but to avoid the overall shutdown command, the
thermometer can be exposed to artificial heating, given that the Emergency
Shutdown Valves (ESV) are overridden to be placed in an open position. It
is only necessary to verify that they (in reality) would have been closing in
the case of an emergency situation. Just like before, full production is main-
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tained under test conditions, which obviously is of great economic advantage.
Last, but not least, the application that is directed for operational purposes
shall be discussed. Imposing an override action on an element makes it pos-
sible to overrule any shutdown action that may originate from critical state
conditions detected on the inputs. This can be of great use when safety lim-
its are considered to be too strict, or when strange system behavior leads to
inconsequent and ambiguous shutdown demands. The operator then has the
ability to prevent shutdowns considered as ”unnecessary”, until the prob-
lem is resolved. It also serves as a tool for making it realizable to push
production limits towards upper production bounds, so that earnings are
maximized. However, this is a two-sided phenomenon because of the danger
that is often related to such an action. It is precisely the related aspect of
danger that will be thoroughly discussed in the next following section.
2.6 Risk-related aspects
The risk associated with an override depends on the number of overrides
that are alive in the system simultaneously, in addition to the length of the
time period the override is held active. It may be, in some cases, that the
cumulative risk of having multiple overrides applied to one single (coincid-
ing) process unit, constitutes a greater danger than the sum of the individual
risks associated with each and every one of them [5]. This is an aspect that
must be taken into account before a work permit is issued for the area. A
work permit is a safety regulatory measure which ensures that the workers
are capable of carrying out their specific job tasks in a safe manner [13].
Although the SASs installed on facilities today mostly provide a log fea-
ture that is keeping track of live inhibits and overrides present in the system,
handwritten logbooks placed in the Central Control Room (CCR) are still in
use. This shall also be supported later, as one of the installations included
in this thesis’ survey only recorded overrides by the use of pen and paper.
Otherwise, handwritten logbooks can be necessary because the computerized
safety system does not have the ability to capture all types of overrides that
are possible to implement. These are typically overrides that are carried out
manually and by hardwiring, such as placing a jumper between two contact
surfaces so that the signal travels in circuit outside the element. Those that
are not registered electronically must be recorded on paper. Since this pro-
cess depends on human factors and abilities (i.e. requires that the operator
remembers to log the event every time), it introduces a potential source of
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error of human character, which is often the type of error that is most crucial
for an accident to take place.
To minimize the risk for human errors to occur, checks of logbook up againts
the actual plant situation should be done regularly, and several parties should
be involved in the verification [5]. In Table 2.1, a proposition of the parties
that should be involved in the verification process is made, together with
some corresponding time intervals of how often the check should take place.
An inspection arrangement should be initiated by the operations manager
at every interchange in shift, so that operators are up to date on the sit-
uation each time they go on duty. Furthermore, it is proposed that the
site manager is involved in the override control on a weekly basis, while the
technical/engineering manager within the company is engaged monthly.
Table 2.1: Verification table of overrides, based on the one presented in [5].
Control
room opera-
tor
Operations
manager
Site man-
ager
Technical
authority
Every shift Yes Yes
Weekly Yes
Monthly Yes
Another measure of preventive character is to undertake a risk analysis of any
action that may lead to an impairment of the overall installation safety. Of
course, this has to be done before the relevant action is carried out in order
to have any effect. The thouroughness of the assessment will vary, depending
on the nature of the impairing act. For start-up overrides, an assessment may
even be unnecessary, unless active overrides are already present in the same,
coinciding part of the process location [5]. This does not, however, apply
to start-up and shutdown of the plant in general. During these activities,
large variations in pressure, temperature and other process states will take
place, thus a larger risk for having occurances of process instability during
these highly-dynamical phases is more likely than during normal steady-state
operation [14].
One of the most dangerous aspects related to having inhibits, overrides
and/or bypasses alive in the system, is the risk for that the plant process
is evolving in such a way that the missing feature (which was ”removed” as
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a consequence of the impairing action) suddenly should be needed; that a
process demand is made while the specific SAS functionality is temporar-
ily unavailable [15]. This unfavourable aspect stems from the fact that if a
Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) is disabled by operator, the part of the
process that is placed under protection by the disabled SIF will still continue
to serve its purpose, that is to participate in the overall production process.
This results in that the plant is regarded as ”available”. However, the pro-
duction is carried through without the normal safeguarding environment, so
the SAS is considered as ”unavailable”. If fundamental, critical SIFs were
disabled and a function call from the process is made, it is conceivable that
dangerous situations may arise [16].
It is important that operators and other people that are in contact with
the applications get extensive experience so they can build up self-confidence
when it comes to governing the process and the SAS in general. This can
be explained by using a well-known term within the discipline of psychology,
saying that they gain a ”sense of coherence” for their work [17], i.e.:
• they find their work-related activities meaningful
• they understand the logic behind their actions, i.e. they understand
the consecutive result of the observed outputs logically based on the
imposed input values
• they perceive their job as manageable
Although it may often appear to third-party individuals that the technical
elements of the process control are making up ”the big differences” in the
overall picture, it is important to not neglect the human factors that actu-
ally play an important role in the operation of a plant. The mind of the
operator tends to be reflected in the way of governing the SAS. This is why
the above-mentioned points are included in this section and considered as
fundamental, despite that they are actually embraced by a field that is as
diverse as psychology.
Furthermore, a phenomenon that is proven to be provoked by frequent ap-
plication usage is something that is called systematic failure. A systematic
failure is, according to IEC 61511, a failure related in a deterministic way
to a certain cause, which can only be eliminated by a modification of the
design or of the manufacturing process, operational procedures, documenta-
tion or other relevant factors. In particular, it can be said that this type of
failure is associated with improper setting and resetting of inhibits/overrides
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[15]. As it can be understood from the definition, it can represent a very
comprehensive process to actually eliminate and rule out the possibility for
systematic failures to be introduced in the system. However, these failures
can be revealed by the operator if he/she executes a deterministic pattern
or sequence of actions, hence making it possible to identify in exactly which
succession the events are triggered. A diagram can therefore be put together
after all the possible combinations have been examined. In future operation,
the pitfalls may be avoided by regarding the action-reaction diagram and
perfrom operational executions thereafter.
2.7 Relevant standards and regulations
In this section, regulations and standardizations that directly affect the op-
erator’s behavior in terms of utilizing the facilities inhibit and override will
be regarded. As shall be seen, the regulations issued by The Petroleum
Safety Authority Norway (PSA) have been emphasized in particular, since
these are representing the Norwegian authorities’ requirements for petroleum
operations. However, there also exist plenty other regulatory literature asso-
ciated with the topic, but taken into account that it is difficult to actually
say anything about the operators’ actions with respect to compliance with
these, it is not seen as suitable for the purpose to write innumerable pages
on the topic. For that reason, the aspects considered as most significant are
incorporated herein.
2.7.1 Central PSA regulations
The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) is a governing organization
that issues a set of regulations to ensure that petroleum activities carried
out on Norwegian continental shelf are evolving safely, that is with respect
to people, environment and material assets. The five regulations that have
been published by the authority are called The Framework Regulations, The
Management Regulations, The Facilities Regulations, The Activities Regula-
tions and The Technical and Operational Regulations. Because the facilities
of main interest in this thesis, inhibit and override, are managed by the SAS
operator, The Management Regulations will be of the most interesting char-
acter in this context, also because these regulations are the only regulations in
the collection of regulations that make specific demands on the consequences
of the application usage.
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PSA Management Regulations
It is interesting to interpret Section 5 in The Management Regulations which
deals with barriers, in light of Section 2 which addresses the question about
responsibility for the actions that are carried out at the facility. Section 2
further refers to Section 7 in The Framework Regulations which states that:
”The operator and others participating in the activities are responsible pur-
suant to these regulations. The responsible party shall ensure compliance with
requirements stipulated in the health, safety and environment legislation. The
operator shall ensure that everyone who carries out work on its behalf, either
personally, through employees, contractors or subcontractors, complies with
requirements stipulated in the health, safety and environment legislation.” [18]
The operator is, in other words, responsible for that the operation of the
petroleum activity progresses in accordance with the stipulated regulations.
The term ”operator” is explicitly defined to be ”anyone executing on be-
half of the licensee the day to day management of the petroleum activities”,
which in principle refers to the petroleum facility’s general manager [18]. It
may be useful to have this clause about responsibility distribution in mind
when the focus is moved over to the highly relevant aspects of the regulations.
Because of a recent revision of the regulations, Section 5 is a merger of
what were Section 1 and 2 in earlier versions. Chapter 2 in the regulations
is regarding the management of risk on the facility. In relation with this, the
following demand (among many others) is made by PSA concerning barriers
in the system:
”The operator or the party responsible for operation of an offshore or on-
shore facility, shall stipulate the strategies and principles that form the basis
for design, use and maintenance of barriers, so that the barriers’ function is
safeguarded throughout the offshore or onshore facility’s life.” [19]
In order to have the competence to discuss the meaning of this statement,
the term barrier must be defined. The meaning of the expression is not ex-
plicitly specified in the regulations, but it can be understood and interpreted
as synonymous with the term safety function, i.e. SIF in an SAS context
[20]. For academic purposes, there does also exist a rigorous definition that
can be found in [21]:
A barrier is a measure which reduces the probability of realizing a hazard’s
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potential for harm and which reduces its consequence. [21]
It should be stressed that barriers may be physical elements (materials, pro-
tective devices, shields, segregation, etc.) or non-physical measures (pro-
cedures, inspection, training, drills, etc.) set in to protect the installation
[21]. SIFs that are implemented an realized through an SAS may loose their
functionality if the operator affects them by the use of, for example, inhibit
or override. If such impairing events take place, something must be done
to maintain the level of plant safety, i.e. to preserve the barrier that was
present in the first place. Furthermore, the regulation states what to do if a
barrier-weakening has already happened:
”Personnel shall be aware of which barriers are not functioning or have been
impaired. The responsible party shall implement the necessary measure to
remedy or compensate for missing or impaired barriers.” [19]
It is quite easy to understand what Section 5 in the regulations is actually
demanding. In brief, it can be concluded that an SF shall maintain its role
within the SAS throughout the SAS’s operational lifetime, hence compensat-
ing measures must be implemented when actions of an impairing character
are carried out by the operator. Naturally, it is not told explicitly what to
do in order to compensate for the debilitations in each individual case, as
this will depend on a bunch of parameters (e.g. installation, situation, etc.).
However, this shall be specified in the procedures regarding operational ac-
tivities and maintenance of the safety system, referring the reader to Section
16.2.2 in IEC 61511, which has been spoken of earlier. This will save the
operators and managers for much confusion and disagreement during the im-
plementational phase of the compensating measures.
On the other side, if it is not specified in the procedures exactly what mea-
sures that are to be implemented in order to re-gain safety balance, a general
technical approach will be needed. Serving as an alternative to this is the
model presented in Figure 2.7, which is represented in terms of a flowchart.
It is based on theory introduced in [14] and the figure therein.
26 Chapter 2: Theory and background
Activity that may 
impair safety system 
identied
Plan
compensating
measure
Quality assurance 
of compensating 
measure
Compensating measure 
sucient?
Compensating measure 
veried?
Ready to carry out 
activity that may 
impair safety system
Implement
compensating
measure
No
Yes
Yes
No
Figure 2.7: Procedure for implementing compensating measures.
Considering the chart from a top-down perspective; once an activity that
may undermine function(s) in the safety system is detected and identified,
or planned executed in the near future, planning concerning what kind of
measures that should be implemented to compensate for the reduced func-
tionality should be initiated. It is important to undergo this phase in advance
of the realization of the impairing act. Moreover, quality assurance must be
performed before a decision can be made regarding the sufficiency of the pro-
posed measures. If it turns out that the measures are not sufficient to balance
for the weakened functionality in the system, more efficient measures must
be considered. If the measures are adequately met and proven to be solid
enough, progression towards the next phase (where the actual realization of
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the actions are taking place) can be made.
Last but not least, the requirement for independence between safety bar-
riers must not be forgotten. As most of the other demands that have been
presented, this is also stated in Section 5 of The Management Regulations,
and is reproduced in the paragraph below:
”Where more than one barrier is necessary, there shall be sufficient inde-
pendence between barriers.” [19]
One of the main reasons for insisting on sufficient independence between
barriers, is to try to rule out the possibility for introducing common cause
failures in the system. IEC 61511’s definition clearly reads that:
A common cause failure is a failure which is the result of one or more
events, causing failures of two or more separate channels in a multiple chan-
nel system, leading to a system failure. [10]
The definition is very wide and universal in its wording, but can be un-
ambiguously interpreted to mean that a common cause failure is capable
of bringing down multiple protection layers or barriers/safety functions if
striking the system, when it is spoken of in relation with an SAS. A field
of research is to try to overcome the chance for introducing such failures in
safety systems, and spesifically the reader is referred to [11] if more detailed
theory on the topic is wanted. There, among other things, it is proposed a
method for function testing which may be helpful when dealing with common
cause failures in an SAS.
2.8 BP Texas City refinery disaster
The number of accidents due to improper process control and poor attitude
towards safety systems continues to grow as the 21st century evolves. On
March 23, 2005, BP Texas City refinery, which at that time was America’s
third largest refinery, suffered a major accident as a consequence of that
flammable gas was ignited. This, in turn, resulted in multiple explosions
and fire over a large process area. In total, 15 workers were killed and 170
people injured. In retrospect, there is a lot to learn from the accident, since
it has been subject to extensive analysis by U.S. authorities. The following
facts that will be presented are based on U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard
Investigation Board’s (CSB) animation video of the incident at BP’s refinery
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in Texas City, Texas, USA. The setup of the overall process at the refinery
is shown in Figure 2.8, and the reader is encouraged to address this drawing
frequently during the description of the course of events.
It all started with the preparation of an isomerization unit which is playing
a key role in the process of distillation. This means that highly flammable
liquid hydrocarbons are fed into the unit, since the purpose of the distilla-
tion is to separate the different fluids from each other. The ”light” parts of
the liquid evaporates at an earlier stage than the heavier components, and
are later cooled down higher up in the distillation column. At some point
the feeding of hydrocarbons into the column was initiated. During normal
operation, the liquid level in the tower should not exceed more than approx-
imately 6,5 ft. However, the sensor installed in the isomerization unit was
not able to measure liquid level any higher than 10 ft., so beyond this point
it was impossible to have any idea about the level in the tank.
As the hydrocarbon-feed made progress with time, a level high-alarm was
activated. The operator and workers acknowledged the alarm, but the feed-
ing was not stopped for that reason. The initial start-up phase of an isomer-
ization unit requires that the liquid level of hydrocarbons is higher than in
the case of normal operation. This is because the start-up phase of a process
differs from the rest of the operational phases (cf. start-up overrides). A
second alarm functioning as a redundant alarm to the first should later had
gone off, indicating that the level was still high and rising. This alarm, how-
ever, failed to appear. When the first part of the start-up phase was finished,
the liquid level in the bottom of the tower was 13 ft. (found in later calcula-
tions, since the sensor was not capable of measuring higher levels than 10 ft.).
The work that was resumed a few hours later involved circulation of the
liquid which was already in the system, in addition to further filling into the
tower. However, despite that it was specified in the start-up procedures that
the valve controlling the liquid flow out of the tower shall be set in an open
position at this stage of the process, it was left closed, hence the liquid level
only continued to grow. When, in addition, the heating process of the liq-
uid began, an alarm indicating that the tank was witnessing an overpressure
soon went off. At this point, the actual level of hydrocarbons was 138 ft.,
while the level transmitter inside the tank was broadcasting a level of 10 ft.
and falling, due to equipment malfunctioning.
Some of the heating elements were moderated after the alarm went off, but
the pressure-relief valves which normally should be triggered to open as a
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safeguarding reaction to the high-pressure alarm, did not react. This led
to that a field worker manually had to open another valve leading to the
blowdown drum in order to ease the pressure. A blowdown drum serves the
purpose as pressure reliever for the gas that evaporates from the liquid hy-
drocarbon heating and causes the high pressure. The gas enters the drum
and later the atmosphere.
Eventually, the workers reacted to the situation by opening a valve that
transported the liquid in the bottom of the distillation column to external
storage tanks. Normally, this would have improved the conditions inside the
tank, but due to extremely high temperature, the liquid began to boil inside
the tower, causing the contents to expand and consequently overflow into
the piping. This, in turn, led to an enormous pressure on the automatic
pressure-relief valves which finally responded to open and cause the liquid to
flow further into the blowdown drum.
At some ponint, there was supposed to go off an alarm indicating a high
contents level of liquid in the drum, but also this failed to appear. This
caused the highly flammable liquid hydrocarbons to overflow the drum and
burst into the atmosphere. Probably, according to [22], it was a car running
idle in the nearby area which ignited the substance and caused the series of
explosions and fires.
This terrible incident could have been avoided if the safety at the facility had
been of a higher quality, for example if a flare system was installed instead
of a blowdown drum. The flare system would have burnt off the flammable
gases and, at an earlier stage, alerted the crew of what was about to happen.
Moreover, the disaster demonstrates how important it is for workers to pos-
sess a high level of understanding and process insight, seeing that the episode
could have been revoked if a worker had detected the critical conditions.
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Figure 2.8: BP Texas City process constellation, as given in [4].
Chapter 3
Problem considerations and
methods
In a study like this, it is important to give an account of which conditions
the work is been based on and what kind of assumptions that are made, so
that traceability is obtained. This makes it possible for a third party to re-
conduct the analysis and check whether their results are in compliance with
the ones presented here (and vice versa). First, an overview of the instal-
lations that have been included in the study will be presented. Thereafter,
the different types of data sets will be introduced together with some pro-
vided explanation regarding the nature of each and every one of them. The
chapter is rounded off by giving a detailed problem statement followed by a
proposition of characteristic methods and approaches that were used.
3.1 Installation log overview
Table 3.1 presents an overview of all the installations included in the study.
The table systematically shows the installation identification terms that will
be used throughout the thesis when the individual facilities are being ad-
dressed (identity), the time period of provided log data (log period), and
whether the received information contains knowledge about inhibits, over-
rides or even all general events that have taken place during the entire test
period (inh., ov. and all, respectively). Due to anonymity reasons, the instal-
lations will be referred to as ”Installation A”, ”Installation B” etc., rather
than their real names. This was complied with on request from the collabo-
rating partner (Statoil ASA).
The advantage of having access to the complete event log instead of only
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being restricted to the inhibit/override log, is the possibility to backtrack
past events in relation to instances of, for example, concentrated bursts of
overrides. By doing this, process shutdowns and other extensive activities
may be detected by observing other general commands made on behalf of the
operator in the time-neighborhood of an event. However, it was only possible
to obtain complete logs from Installation D and E. It will not be done any
further investigation of related activities other than inhibit and override, as
the required workload associated with the applications proved to be sufficient.
A significant aspect to take note of, and which can be read directly from
the table, is the lack of a log associated with overrides at Installation F. It
was only possible to obtain a log that dispalyed all the cases of inhibits that
had taken place during the test period. This is due to the fact that the over-
rides are only kept track of and recorded on paper in the CCR. Furthermore,
the range of the log period for this installation is very short compared to the
others. This makes the related results less rigorous, but they do yet provide
a good short-term image of the overall situation. This is the only onshore
installation included in the survey, so perhaps more information from this
would have provided a stronger basis for comparison purposes relative to the
other offshore facilities.
Table 3.1: Installations included in the survey, Y = Y es and N = No.
Identity Log period Inh. Ov. All
A Oct. 2008 - Nov. 2010 Y Y N
B Aug. 2008 - Nov. 2010 Y Y N
C Oct. 2008 - Nov. 2010 Y Y N
D Nov. 2007 - Jan. 2011 Y Y Y
E Jul. 2007 - Jan. 2011 Y Y Y
F Jan. 2011 - Mar. 2011 Y N N
3.2 Preparation of the data sets
The received data sets from the different installations required each a certain
amount of pre-processing and re-arrangement before any useful knowledge
could be extracted. However, the amount of pre-processing that was required
from each installation varied greatly. All the received information from In-
stallation A, B and C were actually proposed in a ”plug and play” fashion,
meaning that no preparatory work was necessary to go through with before
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starting up the analytical part of the work. However, the logs originating
from Installation D and E required a tremendous amount of preparational
work in advance of the analysis. This was solely due to the file format of the
log files; the received history of events at Installation D and E consisted of
92 and 115 separate .txt files in total, respectively. Since neither Notepad
(which is the default program of choice when opening .txt files on Windows
computers) nor Microsoft Word provides any good environment when work-
ing with large data sets, it appeared natural to import the files to Microsoft
Excel instead. Generally speaking, Excel is the program of preference when
operations on large amounts of data are to be made. The program offers the
user an enormous library of functions that are executable on historical data,
and that give well-arranged results.
The import process turned out to be not so trivial and straightforward as
first expected. During the transformation, the dates were totally miscon-
structed leading to interchanges between the year-part and the day-part in
the date format. In addition, the program misunderstood the sectioning of
the columns so that the date often ended up as an event description, making
the results meaningless. This could, however, be corrected for manually. The
process was time-consuming but necessary in order to proceed to the next
level where, among other things, the data had to be sorted by time and date
so that the events appeared in chronological order.
3.3 Problem statement
The main objective of this thesis is to perform analysis (of various character)
of event data collected from a handful of SASs governing different produc-
tion facilities operated by Statoil ASA. There are only events that have the
potential to weaken the safety level of a facility that shall be considered in
this survey, in other words, special emphasis is put on the operator-based
interference with the applications inhibit and override. From experience, it
is widely known that accidents related to oil-producing installations often
are accidents of an extensive character, where especially wildlife and nature
are vulnerable groups (and people if, for example, explosion is involved). A
disaster that took place shortly in advance of this thesis writing is the well-
known Deepwater Horizon scandal where large amounts of oil was spilled into
the Gulf of Mexico and reached continental coasts far away. The responsible
party was the British company BP. However, the outcomes of the analysis
will hopefully help to shed light on the issue of safety in association with the
operator-related application interference, and thereby contribute to increase
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the awareness upon the consequences of impairing functions that are realized
in the system.
In order to be capable of saying anything about the daily-basis operation
of the different installations, the logs originating from each and every one of
the facilities are being regarded with respect to a bunch of analytical aspects.
In particular, it will be interesting to:
• look at the evolvement of the usage of inhibits/overrides over time; to
perform a trend survey
• examine the difference in the utilization of the applications between
different shifts, personnel and day/night periods
• perform a comparative study of the different installations, focusing on
key statistical quantities
• reveal tags that repeatedly tend to show up in the overview
• investigate signals that appear as blocked/overridden for longer periods
of time
• address redundant elements that appear to be ”taken out of operation”
synchronously
Beyond this, it will be difficult to evaluate the events in light of existing
standards and regulations. This is simply because information regarding
compensating measures and other risk-preventive initiatives implemented by
the personnel at the respective facilities, was not possible to procure. In
other words, it is impossible to verify whether an operator action is carried
out in compliance with procedures, etc.
Another thing worth mentioning here, is that the focus of this study has
been to identify and get an idea of the general application usage at the
installations, rather than emphasizing individual events. Paying too much
attention to single events may undermine ”the big picture”, in addition to
that conclusions drawn based on such events can be uncertain or erroneous.
This is primarily because of the lack of insight to information, as named
earlier. For example, if a signal (according to the log) has been inhibited
or overridden for an unusual long period of time, it may be the case that a
new signal has taken over the original functionality possessed by the old one
(without the ability for a third party to discover this), and that the old one
is deleted. Or, the case may be that the signal is completely disabled due to
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an alternative arrangement that has been put into place. However, it shall
be concentrated on actually detecting the cases that stand out in terms of
the above-mentioned points, regardless of the lack in ability to address the
causes of the events, so that they later in time may be investigated further
on initiative from the company.
3.4 Data representation
Figure 3.1 below presents how the logs are put together by the SASs at the
different installations, and how they are represented in Excel. It does ac-
tually show more than just this, namely all the ”types of events” that have
been considered to represent either inhibit or override at the respective fa-
cilities, which means that these (and only these) event types are included
in the study of this thesis. Because the installations are governed by SASs
distributed by different vendors, the events do not completely coincide with
each other. Despite this, it was eventually agreed (after having consulted
with the responsible contact persons) that the instances that are shown in
the figure are the events that correspond to the well-established definitions
of inhibit and override.
It shall be noted that Figure 3.1 does not completely reflect the truth with
respect to the different log appearances. The representations in Excel are
a bit more complex than what is shown here, hence it is only presented ”a
stripped version” of the truth. The truth is that there exist a few more
columns of information, but that these do not provide any useful informa-
tion when it comes to the survey of this thesis. For this reason, they have
been omitted.
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Figure 3.1: Data representation of the different logs.
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Obviously, the first three installations (A, B and C) provide the logs that are
of a character which makes them the simplest to interpret. Insofar as the log
originating from Installation F, this is also true. These representations are
well-arranged and trivial to extract useful information from. The EventText
column in Figure 3.1(a) tells whether an action is an inhibit action (Utkobling
p˚a/av) or an override action (Overbroing p˚a/av), while in Figure 3.1(c) this
can be discovered by looking at the Value column; the activation of an inhibit
is represented by BLOKRT and a deactivation by NORMAL. When it comes
to Installation D and E given by Figure 3.1(b), there were several candidates
jumping on the borderline to be regarded as inhibits/overrides. This was
because the interpretation of the various operations were somewhat vague
and difficult to obtain. But, after consultation with competent personnel,
it became clear that all the attributes contained within the Command field
were event instances that for certain were in compliance with the definitions.
3.5 Methods and approaches
The cumulative amount of working hours spent on the total problem is
strongly dependent on the different approaches used to attack the smaller
sub-problems. This section presents the methods that were used in the dif-
ferent parts of the analysis, in addition to provide some important informa-
tion about the problem itself. Some of the analytical procedures are more
sophisticated than others, but none are particularly complicated, seeing that
the methods considered as being the most favorable for the different purposes
were actually based on a brute force mentality.
3.5.1 Detection of long-term inhibits/overrides
First of all, it should be pointed out that long-term in the context of this
thesis, is defined to be an event that lasts for at least one month. Such an
absolute lower limit was necessary to establish in order to avoid confusion
coming up in the middle of the survey. The limit of one month allowed for a
certain tolerance without being too strict or slack, making it an appropriate
limit for the long-term intent.
There were not many alternatives to choose from in terms of examination
methods when detection of long-term inhibits/overrides was on the agenda.
The only option was simply to look at the timestamp for the activation of
an event, for then to scroll and recover the same signal and its deactivation
further down in the log (unless the signal was kept restrained throughout the
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entire period). However, a way to ease the work a little was to sort the events
with respect to time, from oldest to newest, and then to continue the sorting
by tag number. The consequence of this were events arranged in chrono-
logical order, sorted into blocks of different tag numbers, which was making
the process a little less cumbersome than it initially was. Regardless of this
modification, the task was still the most time-consuming of them all. Even
so, it was an important part of the overall problem to actually go through
with and complete, since the results from the analysis gave a measure of
”how usual” it was to inhibit/override input/output signals at the different
installations.
3.5.2 Redundant inhibits/overrides
It turned out that identifying tags representing redundant elements in the
event log was not equally easy as expected. After consulting with the con-
tact persons and supervisor/professor, it was ascertained that, in many cases,
knowledge about the individual system and its structure in general were as-
sumptions for being able to say anything about redundant elements. How-
ever, during this conversation, it was also established that tags that only
differed by one letter, for example the two tags GP-63472A and GP-63472B,
with high probability could be regarded as redundant elements. These two
tags typically represent pump signals, where the first tag belongs to a pri-
mary pump, and the second one is representing a backup pump (to the first
one). The backup pump is supposed to take over the work for the primary
pump if it suffers a pressure drop or other similar impairments. This requires
that the backup unit’s state is defined to be in stand-by, which can be con-
trolled manually or automatically by the operator through the SAS.
The logs were examined for redundant tags by the procedure of first sorting
the events by time and date, then by tag number. This lead to that the tags
of interest (the redundant tags) appeared sequentially, making them easily
surveyable. To accordingly check for simultaneousness, the time stamps for
their inhibit/override activation and deactivation were considered. For In-
stallation A, B, C and F, this method worked very well. Installation D and
E, however, displayed a completely different approach in terms of tag num-
ber dedication. It proved to be impossible to detect whether two (or three)
elements were redundant by just considering the tag number, leading to that
this sub-problem’s analysis was omitted for these installations. It was also
later claimed by the responsible contact person for the installations that these
did not have any redundant elements other than, for example, that a tank is
provided with two level transmitters whereupon one of them is connected to
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the process safety system and the other one to the process control system.
This, however, is not considered as redundancy in the term’s correct sense.
3.5.3 Shift and personnel
Changes in shifts and personnel take place at fixed times, and particularly
for installations offshore there are tight arrangements for this. For the on-
shore facility (Installation F), however, the whole situation is coordinated
quite differently. It is more convenient to treat such an installation as a nor-
mal workplace and thus implement the shift/personnel scheme thereafter. It
could be attested that the structure of working hours compared to the rest
of the installations participating in the study, was indeed very complicated.
A surveillance of this pattern would have demanded that a large amount of
aspects had to be taken into consideration, which is the reason for why the
analysis of this installation was not carried out.
For all the other installations which are located offshore, the model is very
simple; interchanges in shifts are made at 07:00 and 19:00 each day. In ad-
dition to this, a new operator crew is transported to the oil rig every second
Tuesday, so that each personnel constellation is out on the rig for two weeks,
followed by four weeks of absence. The approach used when examining the
differences in inhibit/override usage between distinct personnel, was actually
to perform a trend analysis of the past events. This trend analysis aimed at
creating an overall picture of the general operator control situation at the
different installations. Through the results coming out of the assessment, it
was also possible to extract useful information regarding critical periods and
intervals. The peaks that were showing up in the constructed plots would
then correspond to weeks of operation where many interventions from the
operator were made.
The technique has for its object to sort the events by time, and then to
count the group of events that showed up within the relevant week. It is
important to emphasize that the counting started from 07:00 the first Tues-
day appearing in the log, and continued throughout 07:00 the next Tuesday.
This kept on in a similar fashion until all the individual weeks were covered,
making two such weeks an equivalent to the time an arbitrary personnel con-
stellation was at work on the rig. Besides this, it was generated general,
descriptive statistical quantities based on the samples that were made, by
utilizing one of Microsoft Excel’s built-in data analysis tool.
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3.5.4 Appearance of same tags in the overview
Since some of the signals are more involved than others in the daily operator-
related control of a plant process, it is of interest to identify and list up the
ones that stand out the most. This may help the managers to detect the
location of the exact sensor/final control element on an installation that
needs service, or where measures must be implemented in order to improve
the situation. To keep track of these cases, the history was sorted by tag
number. By manually running through every tag and record the total number
of appearances, a list could finally be produced (which in turn could be sorted
internally) and presented.
3.5.5 General comments on comparison and methods
In the predecessor of this thesis (ref. [6]), only information coming from
Installation C was subject to analysis. All the presented results in the
paper were generated based on events in the log confirming that the in-
hibits/overrides were written to separate inhibit/override logs. In the survey
of this thesis, however, the results will be based on events appearing in the
log as signals which are sent out internally from the system modules, con-
firming that inhibit/override bits have been physically set in the modules.
Since the analysis of Installation A and B were done solely based on these
signals, Installation C was re-analyzed with respect to the same types of
signals in order to gain an equal grounding to use for comparison purposes.
This introduced new results which deviated from the ones presented in the
previous paper. However, the deviations are very small since the two distinct
logs shall in theory be identical, but due to technical issues related to each
individual system, they are not exactly (but almost). It is also important
to emphasize that the work done earlier is not erroneous, just an alternative
approach with a different basis.
In general, it is known that interesting findings can be made if different
entities within a similar group are set up against each other and compared at
different levels. There is reason to believe that this is the case in the study
of this thesis as well, so comparison of the results related to the different
installations have been emphasized heavily. In [6], a similar study as the one
in this thesis was made, but only with SAS information provided from one
installation. Solely based on the (isolated) results presented there, it was not
trivial to create any comprehensive picture of the overall operator control
situation at the facility. Now, when several installations are participating in
the survey, it is possible to regard the results relative to each other, hence
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making it feasable to draw conclusions based on the noticeable differences.
Although comparison provides a great advantage when interpreting results,
it is also important to mention that the initiative of setting the different
quantities up against each other and achieve a 1:1 comparison relationship
is not always possible. This drawback is due to the fact that the different
installations are equipped with SASs distributed by different vendors, in-
troducing discrepancy in SIF interpretation. This is because the different
vendors have their own way of designing the SASs, leading to dissimilar SAS
setup and configuration. However, after having ascertained that the actual
interpretations of inhibit and override were identified and recognized in each
system, it was possible to perform adequate and meaningful comparisons to
a great extent after all.
For all the following results, the analysis is based on the complete event
log that is provided from each installation, except for the trend analysis re-
sults. Here, it was decided to look at each isolated family of installations by
themselves, from a shared starting point in time to another shared endpoint.
This gave very good opportunities to compare the internal family results di-
rectly. The criterion that must be met for a collection of installations to be
considered as a family, is that all the installations included in the group are
governed by a SAS with the same setup and configuration (from the same
vendor). In the case of this thesis, this is actually equivalent with stating
that all installations within the same family must be members of the same
oil field, i.e. located close to each other and utilizing hydrocarbons from a
coinciding collection of oil wells.
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Chapter 4
Results and discussion
In this chapter, all the results that were obtained for the smaller sub-problems
will be presented sequentially, together with their provided discussions. The
chapter is composed as follows; first, the results of the trend and statisti-
cal analysis will be proposed, followed by a presentation of frequently in-
volved signals. Afterwards, the situations related to the long-term instances
will be addressed, and finally all the observed cases of simultaneously inhib-
ited/overridden signals will be made available.
4.1 Trends and statistics
Based on the knowledge that any change in shift is carried out either 07:00 in
the morning or 19:00 in the evening for all the five installations included in
this section’s survey, the trend analysis was realized in accordance with the
corresponding procedure described earlier. As the figures will show, the first
family of installations (Installation A, B and C) was analyzed with respect to
data originating from the two-year period October 21, 2008 through Novem-
ber 02, 2010, while the second family (Installation D and E) was regarded
over the three-year interval November 13, 2007 - December 28, 2010.
4.1.1 Inhibits
Installation A, B and C
Since the number of inhibits varied greatly from week to week, a plot of the
actual data would appear as very ”noisy” with large amplitude variations
and peaks, and no clear information would have been possible to extract at
first glance. However, if the actual weekly data is passed through a low-pass
filter, it may be possible to determine the general evolvement of the curves
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and perhaps say something about the trend. A solution to this was found
by considering the moving average of the actual data rather than the actual
data themself. The moving average gives an indication of a curve’s further
path, and can be used as a tool in forecasting. The aspect of forecasting,
however, will not be emphasized here. What will be focused on more, is the
moving average’s ability to function as a smoothing application which makes
it easier to assess the general trend under less-dynamical conditions.
The method requires that it is defined a window length that shall be kept
constant throughout the whole experiment. This is an important assumption
for methods that implement the moving horizon scheme. When this quan-
tity is defined, the first sample can be obtained by averaging over the first n
points of the data set, where n is the window length. Mathematically, this is
described by SMA1 =
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi, where xi is the ith point of the data set and
SMA1 is the first Simple Moving Average (SMA) sample [23]. Moreover, the
kth SMA sample can be found by applying the formula SMAk =
1
n
k+n∑
i=k
xi. In
total, there will be N − n SMA samples, where N is the number of points
in the data set. This is also the reason for the delayed start of the curves in
Figure 4.1. The figure shows moving averages of the weekly inhibit activity
at Installation A, B and C over an horizon of 12 weeks. The period length
of 12 weeks gave good smoothing properties while still preserving the curves’
characteristic dynamics.
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Figure 4.1: Moving average of inhibit involvement; A, B and C.
Perhaps the most obvious thing to take note of from the figure, is the strong
correlation between the curves. The attitude towards carrying out inhibits
at one installation seems to depend on the activity taking place at other
installations within the family. Basically, this should not be very surprising,
because all the installations are producing oil from the same oil field. What
this mean, is that there may be ”invisible” dependencies between the oil
wells that could have been seen if a mathematical model of the coupled sys-
tem was regarded. Particularly remarkable is the clear correlation between
the inhibit activity at Installation A and B, where the two curves almost
appear as identical with just a phase shift separating them. This is of course
not the case, but only an interesting observation that is worth mentioning.
When it comes to Installation C, the dependency does only ”show up” in the
latter half part of the curve.
Another fascinating discovery is the fact that if linear trend lines are plotted
for each curve, all the lines have negative corresponding slopes. This can be
interpreted in the way that the trends for carrying out blockings on signals
are generally declining for each installation, which indicates progress in the
a positive direction. The degree of decrease, however, varies a lot between
the installations. The reason for why the trend lines are not drawn into Fig-
ure 4.1, is because of the over-complexity it would have caused, making it
harder to pull out other critical information. This is why there has been allo-
cated space for a separate plot of ”the most successful facility”; Installation
A. The result is presented in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Moving average of inhibit involvement; A.
Without significant effort, it is possible to reveal that the overall inhibit ac-
tivity at Installation C is higher than at the other two facilities. There are
two possible explanations for why this is the case; either (1) the size of In-
stallation C is bigger (measured by the amount of I/Os), or (2) the attitude
towards carrying out inhibits at Installation C is more relaxed seen from an
operator point of view. The peaks of the curves cannot be mapped directly
in a 1:1 relationship with the personnel that possesses the highest ratio of
inhibits. This is due to the adopted approach of moving averages that was
applied to the data. However, to end up at the stage of the above-presented
result, all the instances of inhibits had to be count - every week. The out-
come of this was in turn used to generate some classical descriptive statistics
related to the characteristic weekly usage. Microsoft Excel’s add-in feature
Analysis ToolPak proved very useful for this matter, since the data sets were
well-arranged and organized orderly in an Excel workbook. Table 4.1 below
presents an overview of the major key statistics associated with the actual
data. The following statistical terms are explained in the readings [24] and
[23], which were used to re-gain understanding of the statistical concepts.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics related to the weekly inhibit usage.
(a)
Installation A
Mean 108,9
Standard error 6,9
Median 92,5
Mode 55
Standard deviation 71,3
Sample variance 5082,8
Kurtosis 5,1
Skewness 1,9
Range 442
Minimum 0
Maximum 442
Sum 11540
Count 106
Confidence level 95,0% 13,7
(b)
Installation B
Mean 88,5
Standard error 6,3
Median 72
Mode 0
Standard deviation 65,3
Sample variance 4265,0
Kurtosis 3,0
Skewness 1,6
Range 332
Minimum 0
Maximum 332
Sum 9386
Count 106
Confidence level 95,0% 12,6
(c)
Installation C
Mean 135,5
Standard error 7,1
Median 117,3
Mode 97,5
Standard deviation 73,6
Sample variance 5413,5
Kurtosis 0,4
Skewness 0,9
Range 337
Minimum 0
Maximum 337
Sum 14365
Count 106
Confidence level 95,0% 14,2
The purpose here is not to thoroughly discuss each and every one of the
table entries above, but rather to highlight and comment the variables that
are most interesting and perhaps differs a lot from the other installations.
Most of the quantities are well-known, but a few of them may need a short
explanation. Kurtosis is an introduced statistical quantity with the intention
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of measuring the ”heavyness” or ”peakedness” of the tail of a probability dis-
tribution or data set. The highly positive kurtosis of Installation A reflects
the fact that the major part of the inhibits were undertaken in the earlier
phase of the time interval; it actually indicates that the trend of the curve is
declining, as mentioned earlier.
The mean (or expected value) shows that the highest number of inhibits
an arbitrary week during the period of investigation can be expected to
be observed at Installation C. Moreover, the smallest dispersion from the
mean, the standard deviation, can be anticipated at Installation B, which
demonstrates that the distribution is more ”even” or ”uniform” there than
at the other facilities. The sample variance is simply the standard deviation
squared. The count is measured to be 106 for all the installations, indicating
that the period of study ranges over 106 weeks.
The installations have all in common that they are witnessing at least one
week where no inhibits were undertaken, hence the entry of minimum= 0.
The range is equal to the maximum number of interventions from operator
during a week, and the highest activity can be found at Installation A in the
period November 18, 2008 - November 25, 2008. Here, it was carried out 442
cases of inhibit interventions. It should be reminded that ”interventions”
incorporates both activations and deactivations of the application. There
are also cases where the operator performs an activation/a deactivation of
the function multiple times, sequentially, with just seconds in between each
action, or that the signal is broadcast several times due to unknown reasons.
This aspect, however, is not accounted for in the analysis in order to avoid
highly complex results.
Other basic quantities are mode and median. These say something about the
value that appears the most frequently and the central value in a data se-
quence, respectively. Furthermore, by regarding the total amount of inhibits
made during the entire test period, Installation C represents the facility with
the most occurences with a number of 14 365, or 135,5 on average per week
(which is the mean).
The standard error of the mean can simply be found by calculating σm =
σ√
n
,
where σ is the standard deviation and n is the number of samples (the count).
There is also presented a confidence interval corresponding to a confidence
level of 95%, which assumes that the samples are normally distributed, or
Gaussian. The intervals are not proposed explicitly, but can easily be found
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by computing µ ± z0,95σm, where z0,95 is found by standard normal table
lookup and µ is the mean.
Installation D and E
In, respectively, Figure 4.3 and Table 4.2 below, the results of the identical
analysis which was carried out on the weekly inhibit data of Installation
D and E, are introduced. Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the
evolvement is the great difference in the utilization of the blocking facility
in the earlier weeks of the test period. At this point in time, the activity at
Installation E appears as, by far, much higher than the activity at Installation
D. Which can be seen from the entries of the table that are representing the
total amount of interventions taken place during the whole period, this is also
the case when all the weeks of operation are accumulated together. Indeed,
there are certain individual weeks that are functioning as major contributors
to increasing the overall average, but the trend is generally that there are,
especially during the first 60 weeks of the moving average, realized many more
inhibits at Installation E than at D, before the pattern apparently flattens
out and levels with the one of the other graph. Despite of this image, it is
Installation D that possesses the week in which the most interventions were
made; Week 89 with a count of 369 interventions.
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Figure 4.3: Moving average of inhibit involvement; D and E.
There is no longer any correlation to take notice of, neither any significant
pattern that indicates any decline or increase in trend (besides the aforemen-
tioned situation at Installation E which will have a descending effect on a
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plotted trend line), in contrast to the other installations presented earlier.
The underlying causes to the clearly observable peaks at the week intervals
89-99 and 50-56 at Installation D and E, respectively, are in fact distinct.
When the focus is turned back on the Excel worksheet where also the actual
data are stored, it is trivial to detect that the direct cause to the peak pe-
riod of Installation D is an abnormally high level of activity that takes place
during the weeks 88/89 (with corresponding 272/369 inhibit interventions).
However, the peak of Installation E stems from a critical period during the
Weeks 44-50, where an extraordinary large amount of operator interferences
were made.
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics related to the weekly inhibit usage.
(a)
Installation D
Mean 51,9
Standard error 3,8
Median 39
Mode 22
Standard deviation 48,9
Sample variance 2388,9
Kurtosis 13,4
Skewness 2,9
Range 369
Minimum 0
Maximum 369
Sum 8453
Count 163
Confidence level 95,0% 7,6
(b)
Installation E
Mean 77,5
Standard error 5,2
Median 56
Mode 22
Standard deviation 66,5
Sample variance 4417,5
Kurtosis 0,4
Skewness 1,2
Range 265
Minimum 0
Maximum 265
Sum 12639
Count 163
Confidence level 95,0% 10,3
When the installations have been compared within their home families, it can
be dedicated a few words to how the situation appears between the families.
This is done best by considering the tables of statistics, and primarily the
entry related to the mean; obviously, it can be expected a significant higher
number of blockings during an arbitrary week of operation at one of the
installations contained within the first family, than the second. Moreover,
the usage of blockings in the second family of installations appears as more
smooth and uniform (without taking into account the exceptional case in the
start-phase of Installation E). This is also reflected by the standard deviation
which states that the fluctuation around the mean is generally higher for the
first family than for the second.
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4.1.2 Overrides
Installation D and E
On an equal footing with the inhibits, the overrides were counted on a week-
to-week basis, making it possible to reconstruct the operator actions at each
installation in a plot. In this case, however, equally good results by utilizing
the approach of moving averages were not possible to obtain. This was due
to the scattered existence of override incidents compared to the inhibits.
A moving average would have given a distorted impression of the actual
situation, hence justifying the alternative solution of plotting the actual data
in a bar diagram. A presentation of the conditions related to the override
usage at Installation D and E will first be given, followed by the results that
were obtained for Installation A, B and C. For the former case, the collected
data are sketched in Figure 4.4, while the generated statistics are presented
in Table 4.3.
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Figure 4.4: Weekly override activity at Installation D and E.
The chart primarily expresses the huge difference between the two facilities
in the ways of perfoming plant control through the utilization of overrides.
By assuming that already one override has been realized during an opera-
tional week at Installation D, the probability for that more than hundred
others also have been carried out within the same week, is very high. This
is worth dedicating a wondering thought; why is this the case? It has been
impossible to obtain a good answer to this question, so it is recommended to
investigate this further by competent people with sufficient insight into the
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plant management. The information that is provided at this point in time
is insufficient in order to draw any conclusion about this. This is why, as
stated earlier, it is viewed as more important to present the situations as they
actually appear based on the received logs, as this cannot be misinterpreted.
Another remarkable aspect is the overall small amount of overrides at In-
stallation E. It is interesting to think of that it is actually legitimate to
conclude that the ratio of the total amount of overrides at Installation D
versus Installation E is 17, especially when the two facilities that have been
considered belong to the same family of installations. Obviously, there is
something fundamentally different in the approach of performing plant op-
eration. It is not of particular interest to address the tables of statistics any
further here, since the bar diagram speaks for itself.
Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics related to the weekly override usage.
(a)
Installation D
Mean 24,7
Standard error 6,9
Median 0
Mode 0
Standard deviation 88,2
Sample variance 7779,9
Kurtosis 14,5
Skewness 3,8
Range 552
Minimum 0
Maximum 552
Sum 4025
Count 163
Confidence level 95,0% 13,6
(b)
Installation E
Mean 1,5
Standard error 0,5
Median 0
Mode 0
Standard deviation 6,6
Sample variance 43,3
Kurtosis 53,3
Skewness 7,0
Range 58
Minimum 0
Maximum 58
Sum 237
Count 163
Confidence level 95,0% 1,0
Installation A, B and C
When the other family of installations is considered, it is easy to discover
that the conditions regarding override interventions at the three facilities are
not equally dramatic compared to the case above. The visualization of the
results is presented in Figure 4.5, while the key statistics related to them
are given in Table 4.4. Very rarely, it occurs a large number of overrides
within one single week of operation. When this is said, there are still a few
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weeks that are related to high activity; Week 44 at Installation C is the (by
far) most hectic period - a total of 63 override interventions were realized.
Furthermore, it is pointed out that Week 6, 46 and 70 are instances of busy
periods at Installation C. The most eventful periods at Installation A are
the weeks which are assigned the numbers 31, 48, 80 and 98. The period
where the majority of the overrides were carried out at Installation B, were
the Weeks 24 and 29. It is interesting to observe how the override actions are
correlated between Installation A and B, with special regard to the peaks at
Weeks 79/80 and 97/98.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 67 70 73 76 79 82 85 88 91 94 97 10
0
10
3
10
6
O
ve
rr
id
es
Weeks, starting from Tuesday 21.10.2008 at 0700 
Install. A Install. B Install. C
Figure 4.5: Weekly override activity at Installation A, B and C.
It cannot be said that there is something fundamentally different in the way
of controlling the installations through the usage of overrides on the basis of
the plot above and the tables below. However, if the two families are again
set up against each other, it can be concluded that the application usage
schemes for the two families are in fact so different that they are nearly
incomparable; Installation D exhibits an abnormally high utilization during
certain weeks, Installation E exhibits a noticeable low amount of overrides
during an arbitrary week, while the installations contained within the first
family display a less dynamical and ”more stable” practice of the override
feature.
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Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics related to the weekly override usage.
(a)
Installation A
Mean 3,8
Standard error 0,6
Median 2
Mode 0
Standard deviation 6,3
Sample variance 39,7
Kurtosis 14,2
Skewness 3,1
Range 43
Minimum 0
Maximum 43
Sum 408
Count 106
Confidence level 95,0% 1,2
(b)
Installation B
Mean 3,2
Standard error 0,7
Median 0
Mode 0
Standard deviation 6,9
Sample variance 47,1
Kurtosis 20,6
Skewness 4,1
Range 46
Minimum 0
Maximum 46
Sum 340
Count 106
Confidence level 95,0% 1,3
(c)
Installation C
Mean 2,7
Standard error 0,7
Median 0
Mode 0
Standard deviation 7,6
Sample variance 58,2
Kurtosis 38,7
Skewness 5,6
Range 63
Minimum 0
Maximum 63
Sum 290
Count 106
Confidence level 95,0% 1,5
4.1.3 Other comments on trend tendencies
Another interesting finding that was made during the survey of this seciton,
is that the operator activity with respect to activation and deactivation of
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inhibits tend to increase in the time-neighbourhood of shift interchanging.
This indicates that the operators, as individuals, are having preferences in
terms of what kind of signals they want to keep blocked when they are in
charge of the SAS. The tendency is generally that some occurences of block-
ings that have been made at an early stage of the shift, are being annulled
just before a different crew is taking over the control. Then, when the new
operator is in place, other tags are being subject to the same pattern. This
may imply that there is no clear, congruent instruction which exclusively is
being met during operation.
A different pattern can be observed when regarding the activity at day ver-
sus night. Without going into any details, it can confidently be said that
the major part of events concerning plant process operation are taking place
during daytime. This is actually no surprise; the daylight is providing visi-
bility, hence making every job task easier to perform. Furthermore, there are
presumably more workers on duty at day than at night, making it possible
to attain a higher rate of production at daytime.
4.2 Frequently involved tags
Some signals are more involved in blockings/overrides than others, and the
primary interest in this part of the study is to act as a watchdog for these
”vulnerable” signals. It is not desirable that signals are exposed to these
impairments more often than necessary, thus it is not preferable that an op-
erator performs active process control through regulation of information flow
between logic solver and sensor/final control element. Furthermore, it will
be useful to observe which groups of signals that stand out at the respective
installations, i.e. whether it (for example) seems to be a collection of tem-
perature tags that tops the list of ”the most busy tags”, or a group of level
signals. It will also be of significance to notice if the operator involvement
pattern tends to vary among the facilities. Once again, it is stressed that the
analysis aims at providing the reader with an overall (general) picture of the
situations rather than reflecting the more detailed, event-specific image.
4.2.1 Inhibits
As each inhibit/override is implemented and realized in the system, the event
pops up in the total overview in addition to being recorded in separate in-
hibit/override logs. All these cases of events were counted and stored in a
worksheet so they could be visualized through diagrams. Because the time
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scales of the logs originating from the different installations varied widely, a
solution to the presentation problem had to be found. It was concluded that
the best way to propose the results so that the possibility for comparison was
not completely ruled out, was to divide the total amount of interventions re-
lated to each tag by the number of weeks with provided log data, so that
the quantity ”number of interventions per week, on average” was obtained.
The quantity represents the frecuency of occurences in an orderly way and
has the corresponding denomination intervention(s)
week
. This can be attested by
the y-axes of the sub-figures included in Figure 4.6. More specifically, the
figure shows the three most frequently inhibited signals at each installation.
Due to excessive space requirements, there was not room for presenting more
than three characteristic signals related to each installation.
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Figure 4.6: Top three most frequently inhibited signals.
Since Installation A, B and C are installations belonging to the same family,
it would be obvious to believe that the difference between their way of prac-
ticing inhibits is not very large. However, if their correspondig figures are
considered, this hypothesis is both correct and erroneous at the same time;
the tags coming in as 1st, 2nd and 3rd place in the overviews do all appear
with the approximately same frequency compared to each other, except for
LAHH-20009 which turns out to be quite superior. In addition to this, it
is fascinating to observe that there are only pressure-related signals repre-
sented in the plot of Installation B, while at Installation C there are only
level-related signals. This may indicate that there exist distinct thoughts
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related to the application usage between the different installation’s person-
nel, and that it is reason to believe that these thoughts are reflected through
their daily operation. It is not a part of the task to draw any conclusions
about this issue, since the base of information and results is too weak for
this. In any case, it is interesting to dedicate the topic some thoughts and
philosophize over some of the differences that are showing up. However, the
most important thing is to let the numbers speak for themselves. Regardless
of this, there should exist one common guideline that describes, step by step,
what should be done if the need for the application arises.
Another remarkable aspect with the figure, is that the onshore facility (Instal-
lation F) exhibits a superior domination over the others; the tag 46FT5074
03 has a weekly average of 19, 1 interventions
week
. This is beyond what any other
installation can display, hence the ”reward” for including such an installation
in the study as well, begins to emerge. It should be recalled that the pro-
vided log time period only spans the first three months in the year of 2011,
in contrast to the other logs coming from the rest of the installations which
are covering up to several years of events. However, because the history can
attest that the tag is being interfered with and engaged very often and at
regular time intervals, the possibility for that this is just accidental within a
small time interval, can nearly be eliminated. Since the number of appear-
ances of this tag in the overview differs so much from the signals coming in
as 2nd and 3rd place at the same installation, one can assume that there are
problems with the element itself or the signal being transmitted from it, that
is root to the frequent operator intervention. Incidentally, the affected signal
is related to an outlet of a pump which is member of a pump network provid-
ing a second-order level of redundancy. The situation at Installation D and
E shall not be discussed in any large extent, since there were no noticeable
outcomes here. The operator behavior at the two installations seems quite
similar, and both pressure and level transmitter tags are incorporated in the
rankings.
4.2.2 Overrides
Figure 4.7 portrays the results of the same analysis which was done for the
overrides. It is clear that there are some cases also here that stand out from
the rest of the group. The first thing that comes to mind is the large differ-
ence between the amount of overrides applied to the top signal of Installation
C compared to all the others, included the signals for the installations within
the same family. The high frequency of the appearances of this signal was
also discovered in an earlier work, so for more detailed information on this
4.2 Frequently involved tags 59
the reader is referred to [6]. Beyond this, it can generally be said that inter-
ference with the override application on selected signals within family one,
generally is higher than for family two, where the utilization of overrides is
less widespread and frequent. It must not be forgotten that it was found
earlier (from the descriptive statistics of the overrides) that it occured ap-
proximately 17 times more overrides at Installation D than at E during the
entire test period. The fact that the frequency related to each signal is quite
equal between the two, is just witnessing that Installation D involves a much
wider constellation of signals in the overall override process.
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Figure 4.7: Top three most frequently overridden signals.
It is also useful to address the distinction in types of tags that are overridden
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most frequently at the different facilities. Because of vaguenesses or total lack
of tag description, this is not always feasible. For Installation B and D there
are only ESD-related signals which are represented in the diagram. These are
typically actions taken by the operator in order to prevent a shutdown event
so that production is maintained. At Installation C, it is also an ESD-related
signal at the top, followed by two shutdown signals to an unknown element
and a pump, respectively.
4.3 Long-term instances of the applications
Since the method that was used to reveal long-term events is based on exam-
ining the logs with the human eye, the guarantee for that all existing cases are
found, vanishes. The majority of the instances, however, will still be discov-
ered with high probability, since this section’s study (especially) was devoted
high accuracy and thoroughness. For consistency and practical reasons, the
quantities describing the results in this section will be given in ”interventions
per week, on average”, as in the previous section. From an overall perspec-
tive, it was observed many cases of long-term events (inhibits/overrides that
lasted for more than one month), thus a list of each and every one of them
would not have functioned as a descriptive source of information. No general
indication of the situations could have been extracted from this, in addition
to that the reader would have experienced such an approach as overwhelming.
Every single long-term event is, however, addressable in the Excel worksheet
that was used to store the acquired information, and which the histograms
that follow are based on.
4.3.1 Inhibits
Before moving on to discuss the results, it is once again emphasized that
an intervention is either an activation or a deactivation of an operation.
This means that the number of activations is approximately the number
of interventions divided by two. This philosophy does also imply that an
SF that gets disabled and never gets enabled back, only is counted as one
intervention, while an SF that is subject to both a deactivation and a re-
activation is counted as two interventions. Figure 4.8 proposes the results
that were found in the counting of long-term inhibit interventions for each
installation.
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Figure 4.8: Overview of long-term inhibit instances.
As noted earlier in the theoretical part of the thesis, the risk associated with
an impairing operator action increases dramatically in line with the time the
impairing event is alive. When the above results are interpreted in light of
this statement, the fact that the greatest danger related to long-term inhibits
can be found in the operation of Installation C, can easily be established.
There are more than twice as many occurences of long-term interventions
here than at Installation B, which represents ”the second worst facility” in
terms of long-term inhibits. Obviously, the first family of installations stands
particularly out in a negative way. Also included in the results are signals
that have been blocked and later phased out and deleted from the system,
where perhaps new signals (with new tag numbers) have replaced the former.
There is no overview available of the signals this apply to, and it is just a
small percentage of the signals that are subject to a replacement, hence this
aspect is not important to take into account when interpreting the results.
On average, the operators at Installation E intervene with one more long-
term instance of the blocking function compared to Installation D during an
operational week, which is not an appreciable difference (nor a particularly
high number). This also applies to Installation F, where the operators seem
to be good at avoiding long-term instances of inhibits.
4.3.2 Overrides
In general, it is realized a lot more inhibits than overrides during the oper-
ational time of an installation. The explanation to this is that the need to
prevent shutdown actions does not arise with an equally high frequency as
the need for making the logic independent from certain sensor input signals,
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in addition to the fact that an override possesses the potential of exerting
a greater danger than an inhibit. This is due to the fact that the last and
crucial element in the chain of information flow (the final control element)
which is the only element with the ability to affect the existing process state,
is restrained in its action. Despite this, it is actually carried out many more
long-term overrides than inhibits at Installation D, which can be seen from
Figure 4.9. This is an alarming observation and a very exceptional situation
compared to the others. The situation at Installation C is also completely
reversed, but this time in a positive way; from being the installation that
possesses the highest number of long-term instances of blockings, it is now
a facility that exhibits an excellent practice in terms of nearly not realizing
any long-term overrides at all (just 0,03 per week).
0,49 0,42
0,03
1,93
0,01
A B C D E
Lo
ng
-te
rm
 o
ve
rr
id
e 
in
te
rv
en
ti
on
s p
er
 w
ee
k,
 
av
er
ag
ed
Installations
Figure 4.9: Overview of long-term override instances.
From the descriptive statistical quantities (and incidentally from the plot)
related to overrides previously presented in the section about trends and
statistics, it was seen that the total amount of overrides carried out at In-
stallation D compared to E, was huge. This leads to that the results presented
in this section should not surprise anyone in particular, since they actually
are a direct outcome of the aforementioned; it is easy to understand that the
relationship between overrides in general and long-term overrides is highly
correlated - if many overrides are realized at a plant, it is more likely that
there are realized a certain amount of long-term overrides as well, in contrast
to the situation at an installation where there are carried out nearly zero
overrides. Nevertheless, it is not good practice, nor an excuse for a facility
to have so many long-term cases alive during daily operation, even though
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the amount of overrides is high. It is obviously the application usage in gen-
eral that should be considered to get the numbers down, since the long-term
situation consequently will be improved if improvements are made towards
the everyday, ordinary usage. Beyond this, there shall be given credit to
the operators governing the SASs at Installation C and E that set a good
example for the others.
4.4 Redundant inhibits/overrides
It is related a considerable amount of danger to blocking of redundant sensor
signals and overriding of redundant control elements. It is important to be
aware of that not all divisions of a plant (or its process) are provided with
redundancy, but only selected, often critical areas. This makes it even more
important to not pull these elements out of operation synchronously. The
resulting situation would have been that none of the scheduled elements had
been able to respond to any process request showing up on-demand, which
potentially can lead to hazardous events.
Again, it is emphasized that it was not possible to verify 100% whether
the following results correspond to cases of redundancy or not, but that it
can be considered as ”most likely” that this is true, taken into account the
signals’ appearance and naming. Assuming that the given cases actually are
redundant, the collaborating company (Statoil ASA) has the opportunity to
investigate the findings further. The main objective of this sub-problem’s
analysis is not to draw any definitive conclusions, because there exists an
element of uncertainty in the base data. However, the objective is rather
to propose the cases that may be interpreted as redundant, and that have
been observed in the log. Since none of the installations displayed any huge
interference with redundant inhibits/overrides, it was actually possible to
present the complete collection of findings in tables, something that was not
appropriate to direct for the long-term case.
4.4.1 Overrides
Table 4.5 offers an overview of all the detected cases of (possibly) redundant
output signals that have been overridden simultaneously. The reason for that
single tags like FP5008A-B and FP6001A-B-C are also included in the table,
is because it is taken into account that such signals have the potential of
being connected to more than one element, i.e. A and B for the former, and
A, B and C for the latter. The table specifies how many overlapping intervals
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of the tags that have been observed, in addition to stating the duration of
the longest coinciding ”inoperative” period. As explained earlier, Installation
A, B, C and F are the installations regarded in this analysis. Among these,
override history is provided for the first three, so the table reflects the override
situation at the Facilities A, B and C.
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Table 4.5: Simultaneously overridden redundant signals.
(a)
Installation A
Identification Overlapping intervals Longest duration
FP5008A-B 1 9 sec
FP6001A-B-C 15 3 days
SD RC A-B CSP 1 1 year +
SD RC A-B CSV 2 24 days
(b)
Installation B
Identification Overlapping intervals Longest duration
EV-53001A-BP 1 3 days
GP-2001A B 2 7 sec
GP-2002A B 6 18 min
GP-2005A B 1 6 sec
GP-5614AP
1 53 min
GP-5614BP
GP-5631AP
2 1 h 50 min
GP-5631BP
GP-5803A-BP 1 50 min
GT-2301A-CV
1 4 h
GT-2301B-CV
(c)
Installation C
Identification Overlapping intervals Longest duration
GP-2505A-BP 1 3 sec
GP-5650A-BP 2 6 sec
GP-5676AP
1 27 sec
GP-5676BP
GT-2301A.CV
1 9 h
GT-2301B.CV
GT-2301A-CV
1 9 h
GT-2301B-CV
The outcomes shall only be commented on briefly and not discussed in any
greater extent, because of the uncertainty that is associated with them. In-
stallation A holds the lowest number of involved redundant signals (only four
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in total), but yet it possesses the definitely longest period of override dura-
tion among all, here represented by 1 year +. This means that the tag was
observed to be overridden for one year, until the log ended. However, there
are only observed single tags in this log, which is in contrast to the other
two production units included in the table. Installation B and C exhibits
a two-level redundancy scheme on, for example, some of their pumps which
are addressed by the tag prefix GP. Incidentally, it can be seen that their
corresponding overlapping intervals are of a very short-term character, which
is reassuring and positive.
4.4.2 Inhibits
To familiarize with the results related to the identical study carried out for
the inhibit application, it is referred to Table 4.6 and 4.7. It was not room
for containing all the results in one large table (consisting of sub-tables) as
above, so they were distributed in two. There were not found any cases of
synchronously blocked redundant signals in the log of Installation B, hence
the table entries consistently filled with NULL. Moreover, it can be seen that
Installation C and F can be accounted for the highest number of involved
redundant tags, and that, among these, Installation F surprises (negatively)
by having ”managed to” perform so many redundant inhibits in such a short
time (3 months of provided log). There are even found cases of third-order
redundancies on some of the level and pressure transmitters (LT and PT,
respectively). It can also be observed that the last two cases in Table 4.6
are referred to as COMPLICATED. The reason for this is simply that it
was very difficult to ascertain the number of occurences of simultaneous re-
dundant overrides that were undertaken for these particular tags, and their
corresponding duration. At the risk of providing incorrect information, these
quantities are not specified.
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Table 4.6: Simultaneously inhibited redundant signals.
(a)
Installation A
Identification Overlapping intervals Longest duration
PAHH61543A
25 8 days
PAHH61543B
(b)
Installation B
Identification Overlapping intervals Longest duration
NULL NULL NULL
(c)
Installation C
Identification Overlapping intervals Longest duration
LAHH-57031A
8
4 hLAHH-57031B
LAHH-57041A
25 9 h
LAHH-57041B
LALL-57031A
20 4 months +
LALL-57031B
LALL-57041A
45 20 days
LALL-57041B
PAHH-24134A
1 30 min
PAHH-24134B
PAHH-56873A
1
6 hPAHH-56873B
PAHH-56878A
1 4 min
PAHH-56878B
PAHH-56890B
1 2 min
PAHH-56890C
PAHH-60017A
1 1 day
PAHH-60017B
PALL-56866A
6 1,5 months
PALL-56866C
PALL-56873A
COMPLICATED COMPLICATED
PALL-56873B
PALL-56878A
COMPLICATED COMPLICATED
PALL-56878B
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Table 4.7: Simultaneously inhibited redundant signals.
Installation F
Identification Overlapping intervals Longest duration
29LT4074A 03
2 20 min29LT4074B 03
29LT4074C 03
29LT5035A 03
1 3 days
29LT5035B 03
29LT5074A 03
3 3 days29LT5074B 03
29LT5074C 03
29PT5086A 03
2 30 min29PT5086B 03
29PT5086C 03
29PT8528A 03
2 20 min29PT8528B 03
29PT8528C 03
40FT5004A 04
1 5 min
40FT5004B 04
46LT8641A/B 03 2 4 h
46LT8641A/B 04 2 4 h
Chapter 5
Conclusion and
recommendations
5.1 Conclusion
Based on the received event logs consisting of variable lengths, it can with
great confidence be stated that there are carried out more inhibits at the first
family of installations (Installation A, B and C) than at family number two
(Installation D and E) during normal plant operation. However, when this
is said, the diagrams indicate a falling trend for all the facilities within the
first family, which is a positive evolvement of the application usage. Another
fascinating aspect is that Installation E seems to exhibit a critical period at
an early stage of the test period, where an unusual large amount of inhibits
were undertaken during, in particular, the weeks of 44 through 50 (relative
the time scale that was constructed internally).
When it comes to the concluding remarks about the overall picture of over-
rides, it shall be emphasized that the way of controlling Installation D versus
E in terms of override utilization, turned out to be fundamentally dissimilar.
It was conducted as many as 17 times more overrides during the entire period
of study at the former facility compared to the latter. In the meantime, the
answer to this mystery is unknown, and the reason may never be revealed
unless further investigation is provoked. Moreover, it was seen that the op-
erator activity at daytime is higher than at night, and the activity around
shift interchanges is also generally higher than during other operational time.
After having all the different tag overviews examined, it was feasible to con-
clude that both PT and LT tags were the tags which showed up the most in
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relation with the inhibit application. Similarly for the overrides, there were
typically ESVs and pumps that were affected and had the highest ratio of
appearances in the log. Especially, Installation C possesses a shutdown signal
that stands particularly out when measuring the inhibit occurences by num-
ber of interventions per week, averaged. This is incidentally the same signal
that also was found in the analysis of the predecessor of this thesis (ref. [6]).
When only considering the offshore facilities and comparing within the collec-
tion of these, the most frequently inhibited signal can be found at Installation
C, as well. However, the onshore facility, Installation F, stands for the most
remarkable outcome of this sub-study; the signal that possesses the highest
ratio of appearances in the inhibit log can be found here. The corresponding
tag was interfered with 19,1 times per week, compared to 7,3 which is rep-
resenting the value of the second most frequently inhibited signal of them all.
In the analysis concerning long-term cases of blockings and overrides, there
were made some quite interesting discoveries; family one of installations tends
to realize a lot more long-term inhibits than the rest of the facilities. Again,
Installation C is characterized as ”the worst” facility of them all, with over
twice as many occurences of long-lasting inhibits (at least one month of du-
ration) compared to Installation B, which is the second worst facility. But,
however, the situation is completely changed when the focus is moved over
to the study of long-term overrides. Here, Installation C exhibits an out-
standing practice, while Installation D is ”the big bad wolf”. This is in fact
very fascinating, since Installation E, which is included in the same family
as Installation D, does not carry out any long-term instances of overrides at
all, so to speak.
Simultaneous cases of inhibits/overrides of redundant elements were more
or less just listed as proposals or suggestions due to the uncertainty related
to the results which made it impossible to draw any definite conclusions. Be-
cause of the lack in informative material, it was not possible to state whether
an event in the log represented a redundant element or not. For this reason,
concluding remarks about this topic shall be omitted.
5.2 Recommendations for further work
In this study, it has been necessary to completely and solely rely on the
events appearing in the logs, which of course is not an optimal solution. To
be able to make comments on the compensating measures that have been
implemented in the different situations, and whether an operator action that
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has taken place is in accordance with standards/regulations, and if the ac-
tion is actually considered necessary to go through with under the given
circumstances, it requires that more comprehensive monitoring of the oper-
ators/CCR is applied. However, this will also demand greater resources and
perhaps that the survey is conducted on an oil rig, or something similar.
Below, it is given some definite suggestions to what can be done:
• get access to internal Problem and Improvement (P&I) documents so
that well-known operational problems can be mapped to individual,
critical situations reflected in the log
• address the constellation and direction of flow of the different processes
at the different installations, utilizing Piping and Instrumentation Di-
agrams (P&ID) to gain process insight
• make oneself personally acquainted with how things evolve in the CCR
and how the staff are working, i.e. to interfere with the SAS and the
equipment that is used and to see how the staff approaches their duties
in practice
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Appendix A
A practical example
It is reasonable to claim that a practical control problem in the process in-
dustries, and especially in the petroleum industry, is to drive the pressure
in a tank filled with gas to a desired setpoint-pressure decided by a superior
controller (perhaps by the use of an MPC scheme) or by an operator. A pos-
sible solution to this problem is to use the basic principle of feedback control.
Such a classical feedback structure is shown in Figure A.1. This is a simple
structure where the reference values1 of the controlled variables, which en-
ter the summation sign from the left on the figure, are compared with the
actual measurements of the corresponding states2 in the plant process [25].
The measured values are subtracted from the setpoint values, and the error
terms are fed into a controller algorithm which decides the magnitudes of
the control signals that are to be applied to the corresponding final control
element actuators. The system continues this dynamic behaviour until the
closed-loop equilibrium is achieved, i.e. the reference values are equal to the
measured values. Furthermore, if it can be assumed that the closed-loop
system exploits a controller strategy that makes operation at the (linearized)
system’s equilibrium points Globally Asymptotically Stable (GAS), conver-
gence towards the reference values can be guaranteed [26].
1A state’s reference value is the desired output value of the state.
2Often, it is not possible to trivially/directly measure the values of the states that are
to be controlled. In that case, a state estimator can be used.
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ProcessController
Figure A.1: Classical feedback structure as known from the literature.
The problem is visualized in Figure A.2 under the same conditions it was
proposed in the text above. Additionally, the possibility for that the tank
may contain flammable gas is held open, as it goes out from the figure.
Clearly, the feedback philosophy has been implemented, and the controller is
provided with a measurement of the pressure in the tank which is obtained
from a manometer. The value of the control signal, which is to be sent to the
servomechanism of the controllable valve, is based on the error between the
pressure measurement and the given setpoint. There are many alternatives
when it comes to the choice of controller strategies, depending on what kind
of properties the person in charge wants the closed-loop system to possess.
This will, however, not be discussed any further due to its irrelevance with
respect to problem description.
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Figure A.2: Representation of the closed-loop system.
After having built up the problem and made a presentation of it, the purpose
of this example will be to demonstrate and comment on how the applications
inhibit and override will affect the the process behavior in general. By re-
calling that the inhibit functionality is applied to an input signal, and that
the override is applicable to output signals, there will be no doubt about the
following statements:
• an inhibit directed towards the signal leading from the manometer mea-
surement to the controller/logic solver will be equivalent to not include
the actual tank pressure values in the calculation of the control signal
• an override directed towards the signal leading from the controller/logic
solver to the pressure control valve will be equivalent to not take the
computed control signal into account when controlling the pressure in
the tank. Accordingly, this does also neglect (indirectly) the actual
measured values coming from the manometer.
It can easily be imagined that improper usage related to the applications may
lead to pressure build-up and potentially dangerous situations. Changes in
process states (gas pressure, temperature, etc.) may happen faster than
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assumed, and the risk for explosion and fire will consequently be within the
scope of realistic consequences.
Appendix B
Application of IEC
61508/61511
In some cases, formal standards such as IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 can be
found hard and confusing to interpret. This may be because of the academic
language that is used, or because it is not definitively stated in each and
every case what should be done to meet the different requirements. With the
intent of making it easier to implement the above-mentioned standards in
practice, The Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF) has issued a guide-
line which helps the user to construct an SAS that shall meet the minimum
requirements for SIL. In this appendix, the most relevant aspects concerning
the operator usage of the facilities inhibit and override in the guideline will
be presented, referring to [27].
One of the demands, is that all the inhibits/overrides/bypasses (impairing
actions, basically) shall be notified to the operators located in the control
room, usually through canalization of the SAS and the HMI that is sup-
ported there. Furthermore, it is proposed that the facilities are provided
with some kind of password protection, so that arbitrary persons are not
able to access the critical functions of the system. It is also suggested that
the override functionality should be considered to completely be eliminated
for safety functions characterized by an SIL of 3 or higher. As in some of
the other standards, this guideline also considers it appropriate to limit the
time an override shall be permitted to be alive in the system (including test
overrides), depending on the SIL class. ”Watchdog timers” can be employed
for this purpose to rule out the possibility for forgetting overrides that have
been realized in the past.
The guideline emphasizes that functional tests, or proof tests, are preferred
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to be carried out as integral tests. This means that the complete SAS loop
which the relevant element is part of is tested, even if the functionality of, for
example, a sensor or final control element is the only verification objective
of the test. Tests of shutdown valves are suggested to be scheduled at points
in time when process shutdown is planned on beforehand (regardless of the
testing), in addition to execution at regular time intervals. Beyond this, the
issue about compensating measures is devoted an own section, but since this
has already been discussed adequately, no further comments will be made
here.
In Appendix G of OLF-070 it is, inter alia, expressed that IEC 61508/61511
require that the Critical Action Panel (CAP) shall provide a global mecha-
nism that makes it possible to disable all inhibits/overrides that are currently
active in the system. An CAP is typically an extension and part of the to-
tal SAS interface which is usually placed in the location environment of the
operator stations, making it easily accessible. Other requirements in the
guideline that have not been mentioned here, are either considered as irrel-
evant or have already been discussed previously in the main contents of the
thesis.
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